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The New Economic Constitution in
China: A Third Way for Competition
Regime?
Young/in Jung* & Qian Hao**
Market needs a regulator. Greedy businessmen try to stand on high
position to take control of the trade for big profits.
-Mencius (3 72-289 B.C.)
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite China's astounding economic growth in the midst of a world-
wide economic downturn,' concerns both in China and abroad have been
mounting over the looming threats that may endanger China's high-geared
economic engine. A particularly urgent challenge is its chaotic market,
saddled with years of unruly competition. 2  The drafting of an anti-
monopoly law, deemed to be the core of an effective competition regime,
has thus gained renewed attention in China.3 The public, in effect, has been
* Attorney, Steptoe & Johnson LLP (D.C.); Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Law Center,
Professorial Fellow, Institute for International Economic Law (D.C.); Member of Korea &
New York Bar Association; LL.M, J.S.D., Yale Law School.
** Member of China and New York Bar Association; Master of Law, Beijing University;
LL.M, J.S.D., Yale Law School. In writing part of this article, I have benefited from various
seminars and conferences sponsored by the China Law Center of the Yale Law School, but
any errors remain solely mine.
1 See, e.g., Liu Shucheng et al., An Analysis of China's Economic Growth Trend (1998-
2002), 4 CHINA & WORLD ECONOMY 9 (2002), at http://www.iwep.org.cn/wec/english/
articles/2002 04/2002-4-liushucheng.pdf.
2 See Zhou Qiren, Competition, Monopoly and Regulation: A Report on Anti-Monopoly
Policy (Sept. 10, 2002), at http://www.ccer.edu.cn (displaying a working paper requested
and coordinated by the Office of State Mechanism Reform).
As early as 1987, a working group on drafting the antimonopoly law was established
under the Legislative Affairs Bureau of the State Council, which produced a draft on anti-
monopoly and anti-unfair competition regulations in 1988. In 1993, the Anti-Unfair Compe-
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calling for an "economic constitution" to harness the rampant market disor-
der, occasioning intensified discussion among scholars. q This has prompted
the State Economic and Trade Commission ("SETC") and State Admini-
stration of Industry and Commerce ("SAIC") to accelerate the drafting of
the anti-monopoly law During 2001 and 2002, four drafts have been writ-
ten and circulated for review amongst Chinese and foreign anti-monopoly
experts. On the basis of these drafts, the basic framework for a long
awaited antitrust regime has started to take shape.7
Although the willingness to accommodate foreign insight and coordi-
nate the drafting clearly indicates China's determination to tap into the ex-
periences of the most advanced competition legal regimes, the most recent
draft (the "Draft"), reveals that the problems that the legislation is expected
to tackle are different from those in developed economies, such as the
United States. Most notably, China (like many other transitional countries)
must first strive to create a free market by overcoming the hurdles originat-
ing from its anti-market legacy, such as administrative intervention. In ad-
dition, years of rapid economic development have fostered market
distortions that deter competition, while the increased presence of foreign
companies has also brought forth additional monopoly concerns. Further-
more, both the design and future enforcement of the antitrust law are inevi-
tably constrained by China's incomplete economic reform and weak legal
institutions. Observers have criticized China as lacking the necessary po-
tition Law was passed. In 1994, the 8th National People's Congress ("NPC") included the
anti-monopoly law in its legislative plan and authorized the State Economic & Trade Com-
mission and the State Administration of Industry & Commerce to work on drafting the legis-
lation. See Hu Shuli, Long Way to Go for Antimonopoly Mission, at http://
www.chinapostnews.com.cn/288/kd04.htin (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
4 For example, during the 5th Plenary Session of the 9th NPC held in March 2002, the
first bill submitted was one to urge the enactment of People's Republic of China ("PRC")
anti-monopoly law from 31 representatives. A Bill on Promulgation of Antimonopoly Law
in Near Future, CHINA NPC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper289/l/class028900001 / hwz204276.htm.
5 Following a general practice, the drafting of the anti-monopoly law, which will eventu-
ally be promulgated by the NPC as a statute, can be assigned to the State Council (the chief
executive branch) or concerned ministries thereof, in this case, the SETC and SAIC.6 The discussion of this article is based on the latest two drafts, which came out in April
and October 2002, respectively. All the drafts were obtained during the process of soliciting
comments. Only Chinese versions were circulated and the English translation in this article
is not official.
7 From a comparison of the two latest drafts, it is clear that both the framework and most
of the stipulations have been settled. This has been officially confirmed in China's note
submitted for the OECD Global Forum on Competition (Feb. 10-11, 2003), in which the
anti-monopoly law draft was included as the basis for overview. People's Republic of
China, Objectives of the Competition Law of PRC and the Optimal Design of Competition
Authorities (Jan. 9, 2003), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/25/2485968.pdf. Although
changes may still be made before the enactment, they will very likely be limited to minor or
expressional ones.
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litical will or capital to usher in a competent antitrust regime.8 However, it
appears the impasse may have been as much due to the difficulty of the
mission as to any politically-deliberated decision to retain certain flexibility
and influence on the part of the government or its surrogates.
Such extraordinary challenges have prompted far-reaching innovations
in the Draft, which is currently the most hotly-debated and closely-followed
legislation to be enacted in China. China's national competition regimes
are predicated on the notion that public regulatory anticompetitive behav-
iors and private anticompetitive behaviors are fundamentally distinct and
should be addressed with different mechanisms. In other countries, it is
longstanding practice that competition authorities do not address anticom-
petitive behaviors created and fostered by other administrative agencies.
However, Chinese competition law apparently attempts to integrate the two
enforcement areas that have been traditionally demarcated: administrative
and private anticompetitive behaviors.
Second, Chinese competition law allows private suits, which play a
role in deterring anticompetitive behaviors, but are not so impressive in
comparison to the competition regimes that follow the E.U. model. The ea-
gerness to combat widespread anticompetitive activities seems to have de-
terred a much-deserved deliberation as to whether private suits will bear
fruit under the current underdeveloped litigation system in China.
Third, the Draft does not allow some of the derogations from the basic
obligations that other countries codify in their competition laws. For in-
stance, the Draft does not contain a blank exemptions provision that puts
out of its scope acts of private enterprises in accordance with other regula-
tory statutes. In short, the Draft demonstrates peculiarities of varying de-
gree that challenge conventional notions of competition policy. In tune
with its ambition to achieve a market economy without completely aban-
doning the socialist political system, China is experimenting with what may
be referred to as "a third way" in framing competition law, which rejects
both pure capitalism and socialism.
Not only will the legislation lay the fundamental rules for the still-
nascent market and substantially reshape the economic landscape, it will
also present solutions to the increasing challenges that developing and tran-
sitional countries face today, thereby adding novel elements to competition
law at the international level.
Nevertheless, the Draft also contains significant drawbacks in terms of
substantive standards for enforcement. The Draft allows for significant
ranges of exemptions with respect to cartel regulations. As for the substan-
tive appraisal standard in merger control review, while countries as a gen-
8 See, e.g., Bing Song, Competition Policy In A Transitional Economy: The Case of
China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389 (1995); Tanglong Yu, An Anti-unfair Competition Law
Without a Core: An Introductory Comparison Between U.S. Antitrust Law and the New Law
of the People's Republic of China, 4. IND INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 315 (1994).
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eral rule review merger mainly on competition grounds, China adopts a
multi-prong standard which assigns equal weight to "national economy"
and "public interests," factors often in conflict with competition considera-
tions. As a result, under the Draft, China's competition authorities will en-
tertain a significant degree of discretion in combating anticompetitive
behaviors. Decades to come will testify to the impact of the newly-minted
competition law on the economic and legal development of China and the
world.
It is against this backdrop that this article will discuss the basic features
of the competition regime China is ready to set up, as envisioned in the
Draft. By comparing different antimonopoly systems worldwide and their
relevance to China's idiosyncrasies in its antimonopoly law, this article in-
tends to promote a better understanding of China's emerging antitrust re-
gime by providing illustrative comments and legislative suggestions. Part II
of this article will focus on the economic and legal contexts of the drafting
of the antimonopoly law in order to illuminate the unique priorities of the
Chinese lawmakers. Part III will highlight the distinctive traits of China's
competition law. Part IV will analyze the Draft provisions' merits and de-
merits. Part V concludes by offering comments on and observations about
the Draft.
II. WHY Now?
A. Competition Policy Gains Momentum with the Deepening of Economic
Reform
Chinese attitude towards competition has undergone a gradual but un-
deniable reversal since the founding of the People's Republic of China in
1949. The central planning system that was pursued until the late 1970s
was a close replica of the Soviet model of "state syndicate." 9 Each state-
owned enterprise ("SOE") had to abide by the central mandatory planning
delivered through the administration agency directly in charge. Immune to
the supply and demand rule and solely concerned with fulfilling their
planned task, the SOEs were reduced to mere production organs. As the
economy was for the most part dominated by the state, with private enter-
prises playing a negligible role,1° it is not surprising that competition was
9 Wu Jinglian, China's Economic Reform: Past, Present and Future, 1 PERSPECTIVES 5
(Apr. 20, 2000) (Shirley Zhang et al., trans.), available at http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/
5_043000/china.htm; see also Wang Lixin & Joseph Fesmith, Bulwark of the Planned Econ-
omy: The Structure and Role of the State Planning Commission, in DECISION-MAKING IN
DENG'S CHINA 52 (Carol Lee Harmrin & Suisheng Zhao eds., 1995).
10 In 1978, for example, state-owned enterprises ("SOE") consisted of 77.6% of the na-
tional industrial output, collectively-owned enterprises ("COE," another form of public own-
ership, which, as far as decision-making power is concerned, were subject to almost the
same degree of central planning) made up 22.2%, and private enterprises only 0.2%. SOEs
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virtually nonexistent during this period. In fact, the prevalent ideology of
socialism labeled competition as the crux of capitalism's inferiority. Ac-
cording to Lenin, competition based on anarchic production and motivated
by unlimited greed for profits would inevitably lead to economic monopoly
and political oppression, which heralded the inevitable fall of capitalism
and justified socialist revolution."l Competition was thus not only irrele-
vant to the economic reality but also inherently condemned by enshrined
communist ideology.
When China embarked on a new journey to modernization in 1978, the
"over-concentration of authority" in economic management became subject
to reform.' 2 The initial strategy was to develop a "planned commodity
economy,"' 3 which supposedly operated in a market setting but did not
amount to an overall market economy.' 4 Accordingly, the policy makers
displayed a modified interest in competition: it was no longer considered to
be unique to capitalism, but could "stimulate the economy and benefit so-
cialism.' 15 At the same time, however, it was stressed that "competition be-
tween socialist enterprises" was "fundamentally different from that under
capitalism".' 6 At this point, the endorsement of competition was only inci-
dental to implanting vitality into state enterprises entrusted with more
autonomy. For example, competition was discouraged when it posed a
threat to other more favorable strategies to strengthen enterprises, such as
merger.'
7
The unleashing of market incentive forces and gradual expansion of
non-state enterprises in turn propelled economic liberalization to an even
higher level. In 1992, the goal of China's economic reform was further re-
adjusted to establish a socialist market economy, in which the market would
also made up 54.6% of the national retail sales, COEs 43.3%, and private enterprises 2.1%.
See Statistical Yearbook of China, at http://www.cei.gov.cn (last visited May 15, 2003).
" 22 V. I. LENIN, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916), in COLLECTED
WORKS, DEC. 1915-JULY 1916, 185 (Yuri Sdobnikov trans., George Hanna ed., 1964).
12 Communiqu of the Third Plenary Session of the l1th Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China (Dec. 22, 1978), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/
252/5089/5103/index.html.
13 See Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of
the Economic Structure, pt. IV, adopted by the 12th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China at its Third Plenary Session on October 20, 1984. For an English translation,
see CHINA'S SOCIALIST ECONOMY-AN OUTLINE HISTORY 672, 680-83 (Liu Suinian & Wu
Qanan eds., 1986).
See, e.g., Shou Shulian, The Prerequisites to Successfully Reform State Enterprises
(July 6, 2001), at http://www.chinareform.org.cn/cgi-bin/BBSRead.asp?Topic_ID=604.
15 Suinian & Qangan, supra note 13, at 688.
16 id.
17 Also horizontal economic co-operation (iingji liang he) between enterprises. See, e.g.,
Center of Economics Studies of Fu Dan University, NEW APPROACH TO ENTERPRISE REFORM
AND DEVELOPMENT 199-203 (1988).
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replace planning in allocating resources.' 8 Competition gained recognition
by its own right as an integral part of the market mechanism.
China has since accelerated its endeavor to overhaul the old planning
system by carrying out gradual privatization and government administra-
tion. It also has carried out gradual reforms of SOEs and pricing, tax, fis-
cal, and banking systems.' 9 Consequently, a legal structure has been laid
down and general consciousness regarding rule of law has improved. How-
ever, the transition process has been saddled with trial and error, and the in-
terdependent nature of the different reforms has often meant a single
improvement has been constrained by countless limitations. In fact, a hand-
ful of reforms in China leave much to be desired, and some institutions
have yet to be established from scratch. Yet China's chosen path toward
marketization has proven to be an irreversible trend. China's successful ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in December 2001 not
only attests to international recognition and confidence in China as an
emerging market economy, 20 but also has been a catalyst to the maturation
of its market mechanism. Drawing experience from other transitional
economies, where rapid privatization without simultaneous promotion of
competition resulted in enormous cost, protecting competition by improv-
ing regulatory framework has become one of the key missions of the Chi-
nese policy makers.
B. Competition Issues in the Spotlight
The Draft of regulations against monopoly and unfair competition in
198822 met with intense opposition. As a result, only the section opposing
unfair competition was enacted in 1993. China has been continuously de-
liberating over the feasibility and desirability of regulating monopoly ac-
tions. Some opponents of this particular law believe that monopolies can
only arise in advanced markets where intense competition renders it possi-
ble for large companies to become monopolies or oligopolies. While China
is still in the process of establishing a market economy, they argue, the leg-
18 See Report of the 14 'h National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Oct. 12,
1992), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shixheng/252/5089/index.html.
19 See, e.g., Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Autumn 2000).20 See, e.g., Brett Williams, The Influence and Lack of Influence of Principles in the Ne-
gotiation for China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 791 (2001).
21 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Promoting Competition and Regulatory Policy, Speech in
Beijing, China (July 25, 1999), at http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/articles/
beijing/pdf.22 See Shuli, supra note 3.
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islation effort would be anachronistic. 23  Leading economists, such as
Zhang Wuchang, go further to question the presumption of whether a mo-
nopoly ever even merits regulation, citing the debate in the United States
over the antitrust law and siding with those who criticize the U.S. antitrust
law to be an arbitrary pretext under which the government interferes with
the economy; they say this is exactly the problem China should counter at
this stage through deregulation. 24 A practical concern of the Chinese legis-
lators is that the law will be severely undermined by weak enforcement
clouded by widespread local protectionism, 2 5  the entrenched interests
which effectively blocked the first legislation draft of 1988.26
During the past few years, however, monopoly-related problems have
aroused public uproar over market control. Concerned that economic de-
velopment and further reform may be stifled, Chinese leaders are resolved
to carry on a full-scale anti-monopoly campaign. Against the backdrop of
such public support, the clamor for an anti-monopoly legislation has never
been stronger. In fact, three key factors have contributed to the resurgence
of the legislation efforts to curb monopolistic behaviors.
1. The Focal Point: Widespread Administrative Monopoly
Unlike in economically-advanced countries, the most hotly-debated
and intensely-condemned monopoly in China today is the administrative
monopoly. "Administrative monopoly," widely used in China, refers to
monopolistic activities initiated by government agencies at various levels
by abusing regulatory or administrative power, including a wide variety of
activities such as legalized monopolies and explicitly-prohibited ultra vires
measures. The rampant administrative monopoly, a remnant of the old
planning system, takes two forms: industry monopoly and regional monop-
oly.
The planning system was so designed that SOEs were under dual lead-
ership. Vertically, each SOE belonged to one specific industry headed by a
Ministry under the State Council and was subject to the Ministry's policies.
At the same time, except for those that were directly operated by the Minis-
tries, the enterprises were also horizontally subject to the authority of local
government at all levels, depending on their size, importance and formation.
Despite reform efforts to separate administration and management, institu-
tional inertia and vested interests have reinforced the "stripe" (tiao, indus-
23 See The Starting Point of Anti-Monopoly (Apr. 12, 2001), at http://
www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/fld/hgbd/bd06.htm.
24 Zhang Wuchang, An Economic Interpretation: The Fuzzy Nature of Antitrust Law, at
http://www.stevenxue.com; see also Paul E. Godek, A Chicago-School Approach to Antitrust
for Developing Countries, ANTITRUST BULLETIN, Spring 1998.
25 See Starting Point to Fight Monopoly (Apr. 12, 2001), at http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/
zhuanti/fld/hgbd/bd06.htm.
26 See Shuli, supra note 3.
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try/department) and "block" (kuai, regional) fragmentation, by which the
ministries and local governments retained incentive and power to engage in
restrictive activities.
2. Industry/Department Monopoly
Now, after consecutive rounds of government restructuring,27 state
monopolies are only found in a limited number of industries. They include
national security, natural monopoly, public goods and services, and key
high-technology enterprises. 28 The Ministries and their subsidiaries operat-
ing or regulating those industries, however, have been widely criticized for
abusing their regulatory power.29 In industries where state monopolies have
been abolished, such as machine manufacture, corresponding ministries
have officially relinquished their power to interfere directly with manage-
ment of the enterprises. However, even in those industries, the ministries
and their subsidiaries often either manage to keep their affiliate companies
or maintain close ties with certain enterprises, and therefore continue to ex-
ert discriminatory influence in varying degree by using their regulatory
power. To illustrate this point, many ministries have fixed industry self-
disciplinary prices, which have in fact functioned as price cartels since
1998.30 To obtain a license from the Ministry of Radio, Film and Televi-
sion, foreign service providers must buy products from one specific semi-
affiliated company.3' At local levels, the administrative departments often
condition issue of approvals or licenses on acceptance of designated ser-
vices. For example, the department of motor vehicles may require vehicle
27 Wang Leiming et al., Five Comprehensive Government Restructures 1982-2003,
XINHUA NEWS (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/
10434/10435/20030306/937651 .html.
28 Fourth Plenum of the 15h National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP")
solidified the policies of SOE reform and state sector adjustment laid out by the 15th National
Congress of the CCP.
29 For instance, in early 1999, when its affiliated airlines started to lower airfare price, the
China Civil Aviation Bureau imposed a ban on ticket discounts. Official Notice from State
Planning Commission and China Civil Aviation Bureau on Strengthening the Administration
of Domestic Airfare to Ban Low-Price Competition (Jan. 25, 1999). In 1999, a power de-
partment in Jiang Su Province required users to buy electric products they provided, based
on an official circular issued by the Ministry of Electricity. SAIC GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 1999,
at 275. In many areas, consumers can only use post packages offered by postal departments,
and are required to accept other services by certain providers. See, e.g., SAIC GAZETTE,
1999, at 278 (reporting that in Hu Bei Province, the postal department required customers to
open savings accounts with them); id., at 132 (stating that in Jiang Su Province, the postal
and telecommunication department required customers to use debit card service from a spe-
cific bank).
30 See SETC, Opinions on Self-Disciplinary Prices Adopted by Some Ministries, Aug. 17,
1998.31 Interview with Han Yan, employee of the company in Beijing, China (Aug. 25, 2002).
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owners to use designated garages for maintenance services in order to ob-
tain or renew licenses.32
3. Regional Monopoly
Regional monopoly is motivated by economic (increasing local reve-
nue) and political (promotion of local government officials depends par-
tially on local economic performance) considerations. Local governments
take various measures to prevent or discriminate against non-local products
and services, which effectively set up regional blockades. Those measures
include: forbidding local businesses to engage in wholesaling or retailing
non-local products; employing discriminative standards in quality inspec-
tion, license issuance and technical requirements; fixing higher prices or
price standards for non-local commodities; and setting up checkpoints on
the local border to obstruct, intercept, or even confiscate products originat-
ing in other regions. 33 For example, in Jilin and Hebei, regional govern-
ments once required non-local beer manufacturers to contribute to a "beer
adjustments fund" which in effect, imposed an additional fee on each bottle
of beer sold in the local market.34 An unidentified local government in the
Northeast was reported to have issued an official circular requiring all local
retailers to sell only locally-manufactured fertilizers. Any violation would
result in confiscation of the "illegal goods," punitive fines and even revoca-
tion of the retail license.35
Widespread administrative monopoly at all levels of Chinese govern-
ment has become a cancer in the Chinese economy. It fosters low effi-
ciency and poor-quality service, creates income gaps,36 encourages
corruption, and prevents the formation of a unified national market. In
April 2001, the State Council (the chief executive branch) held a working
conference on regulating the market order. In the two official documents
adopted in this meeting, the State Council made clear that priority should be
given to combating department/industry monopoly and local block-
ade/protectionism. 37 Authorities have focused exclusively on addressing
32 See The Forms and Features of Administrative Monopoly and Industry Monopoly, at
http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/flcd/fxpl/pl30.htm (May 13, 2001).
33 See Authorities Exposed Monopolistic Practices that Harm the Interests of the Cus-
tomers, at http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/fld/hgbd/bd72.htm (Apr. 30, 2001).
34 See Difficulties in Combating Monopolies, at http://finance.sina.com.cn/o/59830.html
(May 11, 2001).
35 See The Forms and Features of Administrative Monopoly and Industry Monopoly, su-
pra note 32.
36 See Suhainan et al., The Adjustment of High Income in Monopoly Industries, ZHONG
Guo JINGJI SHI BAO (June 1, 2001), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/36/
20010601/479667.html.
37 See State Council Decision on Regulation of Market Economic Order, State Council
Order #11, Apr. 27, 2001; State Council Provision on Prohibiting Regional Blockade in
Market Economic Activities, State Council Order #303, Apr. 21, 2001.
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administrative monopoly during national and local "enforcement cam-
paigns"'38 designed to restore market order, acknowledge the seriousness of
the problem, and echo public resentment against public anticompetitive be-
haviors.39
4. Private Monopoly On the Rise
Private monopoly as a result of market competition and concentration
has also started to appear in China. However, a salient feature of private
monopoly is that it is active at a local rather than national level. This is due
to a lack of national industry concentration, underdeveloped enterprises and
fragmentation of the market.
The rapid economic development of China has seen a rise in the num-
ber of large enterprises. However, they are small in size compared with
their foreign counterparts. According to the National Bureau of Statistics,
there were 2,710 enterprise groupings in the year 2001.40 In 2000, the total
revenue of the top 500 Chinese enterprise groupings was only 89% of the
total income of the world's top three companies. 41 Furthermore, the largest
enterprises in China are often found in state monopoly industries. Statistics
from the State Economic and Trade Commission show that in 2000, the
profits of the top ten enterprises constituted 74.2% of total profits earned by
the country's 520 major enterprises; 42 all of them were from state monopoly
or state dominated industries. Enterprises in monopolized industries other
than those influenced by the state have not been developed.
38 Enforcement campaigns are a common practice in China: during a certain period of
time, normally up to six months, the authorities focus and intensify work on enforcement of
specific laws to address serious violations.
39 For example, the SAIC's campaign wasat a national level in April 2001. The same is
true with local authorities, see for example http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/
fld/hgbd/bd22.htm; http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/fld/hgbd/bd24.htm (the campaign in
Beijing, which began on Apr. 1, 2001); http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/fld/hgbd/
bd08.htm (the campaign in Shanghai, which began in Apr. 2001 and lasted half a year);
http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/fld/hgbd/bd54.htm (the campaign in Sichuan, which be-
gan in Apr. 2001); http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/fld/hgbd/bd50.htm (the campaign in
Kunming, which began in Mar. 2001); http://www.people.com.cn/GB/other4788/20011018/
584573.html (the campaign in Jilin, which began in Oct. 2001).
40 See Han Zhenjun, Chinese Enterprise Groupings Increased Total Asset by 19.7% Last
Year, Guo Ji RN RONG BAO, Sept. 16, 2002.
41 See Statistics, at http://economy.enorth.com.cn/system/2001/09/22/000150552.htm
(Sept. 22, 2000).
42 The top ten were China National Petroleum Corp., China Mobile, China Petrochemical
Corp., China Telecom, China National Offshore Oil Corp, The State Power Corp. of China,
Guangdong Electricity Corp., Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. (group), China Unicom,
and Yuxi Hongta Tobacco (group) Co., Ltd. Their total profit was 156.3 billion RMB ($18.8
billion). See Statistics, at http://www.setc.gov.cn/gjzdqyxx/zhfx/200209140072.htm (last
visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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5. National Private Monopoly: A Case Study
The generally small size and low competitive capacity of Chinese en-
terprises has made it almost impossible to form private monopolies on a na-
tional scale. A case study of a failed color TV cartel is helpful in
illustrating the situation. On June 9, 2000, nine leading Chinese color tele-
vision manufacturers met in Shenzhen for a "color TV producers summit,"
during which they established a price cartel and fixed minimum sale prices
of color TVs. Unlike previous price cartels, it was not orchestrated in any
way by the government 43 and therefore was widely alleged by the media as
a high-profile private monopoly. The State Planning Commission immedi-
ately declared the cartel in violation of Article 14 of Price Law by attempt-
ing to form a monopoly.44 But the authorities did not move to ban the
cartel, as it turned out to be a failure from the beginning. The biggest color
TV producer, Changhong, refused to join the cartel, retailers ignored the
minimum price ajreement, and three cartel members did not enforce the
price restrictions. Despite two follow-up "summits," the price cartel was
never effectuated; instead, a new round of price wars was triggered.4 6
In fact, a closer examination reveals that the reason the cartel failed
was the low degree of market concentration, even though the TV industry47
had the highest degree of competition allowed in China. In 1995, there
were 91 Chinese color TV producers. Ten of these producers had the ca-
pacity to manufacture one million color televisions each year. By the end
of 2002, the number of producers decreased to 68, but the number of larger
producers (with over one million units of production capacity) remained at
ten.4 8 Concentration has been slow and the development of large producers
has been impeded mainly by the following three factors. Many of the color
TV producers are SOEs, who often choose, and can afford to, sustain loss to
maintain some market share. In addition, the large, profitable producers are
routinely asked to take over poorly-performing enterprises to avoid the con-
43 See Lin Yifu, Price Cartel Should be Banned, China Center for Economic Study of
Beijing University, NEWS LETrER SERIES, No. 175, 43/2000 (June 22, 2000), available at
http://old.ccer.edu.cn/newsletter/2000/175.htm.
44 See Li Weiwei, Nine Color TV Enterprises Seeking Consensus, XINHUA NEWS (June 9,
2000), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channe13/22/20000609/97046.html.
45 See Guan Yawen, Color TV Price Cartel Doomed, at http://finance.sina.com.cn/news/
2000-06-16/36897.html (June 15, 2000).
46 See Yang Cui, Analysis of the TV Industry Cartel, SHI CHANG BAO (Aug. 12, 2000),
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper53/1209/183787.html.
47 See Concentration in the Market of Electronics Products, ZHONG Guo GONG SHANG
SHI BAO (Sep, 13, 2002), available at http://www.ctoc.com.cn/free/dcbg/2002/
dcbg0914.htm.
8 Statistics from the Ministry of Information Industry, available at http://
economy.enorth.com.cn/ system/2003/01/18/000493579.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
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sequences of bankruptcy, such as unemployment. 49 This practice has added
substantial costs to those producers and is undoubtedly detrimental to their
growth. Local protectionism has also constrained the larger and more com-
petitive producers from expanding their market share.50 When production
exceeds domestic demand, the rigid market structure forces the TV pro-
ducers to engage in constant and fierce price wars, in which certain color
TVs are sold below cost.52 In fact, the 2000 price cartel was an effort to
stop the suicidal price war and minimize loss rather than secure high profits.
In addition, Chinese producers are only competing with each other in
the conventional TV market, which has lower profit yields than the high-
tech color TV market. Foreign color TV producers dominate the high-tech
color TV market in China. According to a survey in September 2002, five
foreign producers (Toshiba, LG, Sony, Panasonic and Samsung) jointly
held 71.3% of the rear projections TV market in China, while Changhong
held only 9.1%. 53 In 2000, Sony alone profited one billion RMB from one
million color TV sales in China, while all the domestic producers combined
only profited 540 million RMB.54 The high cost and low return of Chinese
color TV producers greatly restrict their potential competitiveness.
Qu Weizhi, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Information Industry,
pointed out that the survival of the Chinese color TV industry depends on
further concentration, expansion of production scale, elimination of less-
competitive producers, and improvement of technology.55 Until then, no
Chinese color TV producer will be capable of dominating the national mar-
ket and initiating any monopolistic activities. Since the attempt in 2000 to
create a color TV price cartel, no comparable attempt in any industry has
been made at the national level. In this respect, the color TV industry is
representative of the majority of industries in China today, consisting of a
large number of small firms unable to monopolize the market.
49 For an example, see the mergers between Konka and Ruyi, Haixin and Jinfeng. See
Wang Xiu, One Perspective on the TV Cartel, ZHONG Guo hl JING SHI BAO (July 6, 2000),
available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/view/market/2000-07-06/39927.html.
50 See Qu Weizhi, Color TV Industry Structural Adjustment Urgently Needed, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 23, 2001), available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/b/20010827/
100556.html.
51 For example, according to a survey in 2001, the yearly domestic production was 30
million, while the domestic demand was 23 million. See Winner and Losers of the TV Indus-
try, BEIJING CHEN BAO (Jan. 15, 2001), available at http://www.trident.com.cn/news/
section/20010115.htm.
52 For example, in 2001, the average price of color TVs dropped 18% and the loss of the
whole industry amounted to 3 billion RMB. See http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/32/
176/20021105/8591 10.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).53 See ZHONG Guo DIAN ZI BAO, No. 135, Dec. 6, 2002.
54 See Lu Xiaohong, Sony Profits Doubles Whole Industry, at http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/jinji/222/5246/5248/20010828/545648.html (Aug. 28, 2001).
55 See Weizhi, supra note 50.
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6. Local Private Monopoly
At various local levels, by contrast, monopolistic activities have be-
come more common. The original structure of the Chinese economy was
based on decentralization and de-specialization. 56 The emphasis on self-
reliance during the Mao era encouraged provinces and localities to establish
all-encompassing regional economies. Since the late 1970s, reform strate-
gies to decentralize power to local governments 57 further reinforced the cel-
lular structure. Local protectionism, especially the above-mentioned
regional administrative monopoly, has significantly increased barriers be-
tween local markets and has exacerbated market fragmentation. A World
Bank study in 1994 revealed a low level of variation of industry structures
across the regions in China.58 In late 2001, the Chinese government ac-
knowledged the persistant problem that "regional industry structures are
still seriously similar.,
59
One of the negative implications of the fragmented nature of the Chi-
nese market is that even companies not large enough to influence the na-
tional market are able to effectively monopolize the relatively closed and
isolated local market. In the more economically-developed areas, where
companies have experienced substantial growth, local private monopolies
are more likely to develop. Most of those monopolistic actions take the
form of concerted action. For example, five big shopping malls in Jinan
boycotted Changhong color TVs in 1997, forcing the producer to lower its60
price. In June 2002, seven gas companies in Xinyang, Henan Province,
jointly raised gas prices by 66%. One term of the agreement even required
each to deposit 5,000 RMB as a "good faith pledge," which would be for-
feited upon violation of the price cartel. 6' A recent trend is cartels orches-
trated by trade associations. In Shanghai, the minimum price for gold was
set by the local trade association, and TV retailers uniformly raised prices
56 See, e.g., Stephen P. Andors, China's Industrialization in Historical Perspective, in
CHINA'S ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT 27 (Neville Maxwell ed., 2d ed. 1979).
57 In the Third Plenary Session of the 11h Central Committee of the Communist Party,
which marks the historical turning point to reform, it was decided that "it is necessary to
shift the ... [authority] to lower levels so that the local authorities and industrial and agricul-
tural enterprises will have great power of decision in management under the guidance of uni-
fied state planning .... See Communiqu of the Third Plenary Session of the 1 1 h Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (December 22, 1978), translated in Suinian &
Wu Quangan, supra note 13.
58 CHINA: INTERNAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION 2 (World Bank East Asia
& Pacific Regional Office ed., 1994).
59 State Economic & Trade Commission: Guidelines of the Industry Structure Adjust-
ment for the Tenth Five-Year Plan, October 2001.
60 See Kong Xiangjun & Du Dengbin, How to Effectively Protect Competition, ZHONG
Guo Jl JING SHi BAO (Jan. 9, 2001), at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/36/20010109/
374202.html.
61 See Yang Jun, Ugly "Co-Operation", at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/30/
20020914/822295.html (Sept. 14, 2002).
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the second day after an association meeting in early 2002.62 The powerful
Shenzhen Furniture Association constantly controls price, "recommends
color or style," and uses furniture exhibition as leverage to enforce its deci-
63
sions.
7. The Globalization Impetus: WTO Membership Raises Concern on For-
eign Competition
China's accession to the WTO in 2001 started a new era for its integra-
tion into the rest of the world economy. As China's market opens up to the
world, a legitimate concern is whether Chinese companies can compete
with foreign firms, and whether China's many fledging industries can fare
well or even survive.
At present, most Chinese business entities are still small and weak.
Even China's large, industrial companies are relatively small when put in
the context of the global market. In 2002, China had only eleven firms
listed in Fortune's Global 5 0 0 ,64 all of which have operated under a pro-
tected domestic environment and enjoyed preferential treatment as large
SOEs; half of them prospered as monopolies or oligopolies. Five of the
biggest employers in the Global 500 are Chinese companies, 65 which indi-
cates serious inefficiency and downsizing problems. Furthermore, despite
countless reform efforts, Chinese enterprises are still vulnerable to interna-
tional competition in most sectors.66 Currently no Chinese firm is qualified
as a global giant corporation, and the daunting difficulties in SOE reform
and economic transition may continue to dim that prospect.67
Due to China's WTO commitments, however, the large Chinese firms
will soon find themselves competing with multinational firms on a global
level. China has promised to fully open up an array of protected sectors af-
ter relatively short grace periods.68 At the same time, because of global
62 Interview with Xiang Ti, Official at the Legal Affairs Office of the Shanghai Municipal
Government, in New Haven, Conn. (June 25, 2002) (Xiang Ti is in charge of drafting a bill
of local association legislation).
63 Interview with Du Xingqiang, Official at the State Council's Office of Legislative Af-
fairs, in charge of market regulation, in New Haven, Conn. (June 5, 2002).
64 Those firms are: State Power (Number 60), China National Petroleum (81), SINOPEC
(86), China Telecom (214), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (243), Bank of China
(277), China Mobile (287), Sinochem (311), China Construction Bank (389), Chinese Petro-
leum (467), and the Agricultural Bank of China (471). Global 500, FORTUNE, July 22, 2002,
at F-1.
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Peter Nolan & Jin Zhang, The Challenge of Globalization for Large Chinese
Firms, available at http://www.unctad.org/endocs/dp_162.en.pdf (July 2002).
67 Id.
68 For example, in the telecommunication industry, long-considered one of China's key
national industries, foreign investment will be allowed. After various phasing periods (2-6
years), geographical restrictions will be removed and foreign ownership will be allowed for
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economic slowdown and China's steady growth, foreign companies have
also intensified their efforts to penetrate the Chinese market. More than
400 of the Fortune Global 500 companies have made investments in
China, 69 and approximately 110 of them established study and design cen-
ters in China. Two-thirds of the world's largest fifty retailers have estab-
lished business in China since China joined the WTO. 71 These are just a
few examples of China's changing role in the multinational firms' global
strategy: transition from merely a large potential market to the world's
manufacturing factory. A few trends in Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI")
have confirmed this transition in recent years, including diversification of
investment structure, localization of management and use of more advanced
technology. 72 One notable change is the increase of wholly foreign-owned
enterprises and decrease of joint ventures.73 Foreign investors are also
showing a growing interest in mergers and acquisitions as a channel for ex-
up to 49% for mobile telephone, and domestic and international service, and up to 50% for
value-added services. In the banking sector, where China's commercial banks lag far behind
other banks, foreign banks will be allowed by 2007, among other things, to offer Chinese
currency (RMB) services to both foreigners and Chinese nationals without geographical re-
strictions. In the automobile industry, which has been protected by high tariffs (55%) and an
import quota, China will reduce the automobile import tariff to 25% by 2006, cut the average
import tax on car spare parts to 10%, and phase out the import quota. Relaxation in other
sectors, such as distribution, energy, securities, insurance and agriculture, will similarly sub-
ject Chinese firms to intense competition. In addition, in those industries which were origi-
nally less protected, foreign investors and firms will benefit from China's compliance with
WTO rules that improve transparency, promote rule of law, enforce national treatment and
eliminate trade barriers. See Protocol on the Accession of People's Republic of China, An-
nex 9: Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services, available at http://
www.chinawto.gov.cn/article/articleview/555/l/280/ (last visited May 12, 2003).
69 See Li Yushi, Review of Last Year and Prospect of China's Foreign Trade, at http://
www.moftec.gov.cn/article/200302/20030200070999 1.xml (Feb. 25, 2003).70 See San Feng, China's Development: Win-win Instead of Threat, JINGJI CAN KAO BAO
(Feb. 12, 2003), at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/36/20030212/921890.html.
71 See Qiu Ju, One Year After Accession to WTO (2002), available at
http://www.saic.gov.cn/redshield/xw/2002/zx62.htm (working report by SAIC). Major mul-
tinational giants, such as IBM, Intel, and Sony, have moved their production lines from other
parts of the world to China in the last couple of years. Toshiba has made China its color TV
technology and marketing headquarters, and LG is turning Beijing into its global technology
center. Wal-Mart, GE, and Unilever have also established procumbent centers in China. See
Yushi, supra note 69.
72 See New Trends in Foreign Investment in China by Multinational Companies (working
paper of MOFTEC), at http://www.moftec.gov.cn/article/200302/20030200071266_l./xml
(last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
73 According to Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC") sta-
tistics, joint-equity ventures decreased 4.74% in 2002 from the previous year and co-
operative joint ventures dropped 18.59%, while wholly foreign-owned enterprises increased
by 32.87%. There were 22,173 newly-established, wholly foreign-owned enterprises in
2002, comprising 65% of the 34,171 newly-established FDI enterprises that year. See
http://www.moftec.gov.cn/table/wztj/2002_12.html (2002).
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pansion rather than joint ventures since 2002.7 This is clearly an indication
of foreign firms' elevated confidence in their long-term presence in China
and in China's competitive capacity.
Chinese leaders are fully aware of the double-edged nature of the fore-
seeable intensification of competition in China's home market. While pol-
icy makers have counted on competition to improve the performance of
domestic firms and boost economic growth, they are concerned that foreign
firms may "muscle in" too swiftly and become monopoly powers before the
Chinese enterprises are well-established. Foreign conglomerates with tech-
nical expertise, efficient management and ample capital possess a formida-
ble power sufficient to crush many of China's fledgling industries. Early
signs have given some foundation to this fear. Foreign companies already
dominate the markets of computers, cables, sedan cars, rubber,
switchboards, beer, paper, elevators, pharmaceuticals, and detergent, among
other products.75 In the electronics market, foreign manufacturers tend to
form and comply with price cartels on the high-tech products they control
to guarantee high-margin profits. 76 Mergers and acquisitions with the pur-
pose of obtaining a larger market share have also been noted."
In anticipation of WTO obligations to reduce trade barriers, China put
into place a viable legal mechanism to address competition ramifications.
In October 2001, on the eve of the WTO accession, the Chinese govern-
ment pledged to enact or revise "a series of laws in compliance with WTO
rules to preserve fair competition and protect domestic industries," includ-
ing specifically an anti-monopoly law. The Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy79
and Safeguard Regulations were enacted shortly afterwards, which China
has prepared itself to use fully whenever possible.80 The envisioned anti-
monopoly law, with fundamental and far-reaching implications for competi-
tion and market order, has thus become a top priority on the legislative
agenda. However, it remains to be seen whether China will resort to com-
petition law to materialize its intentions to protect domestic firms from in-
ternational competition. An unintended consequence of the enforcement of
74 Id.
75 See Lu JIONGXrNG, STUDIES OF CHINA'S FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 167 (2001).
76 See Yi Huize, Foreign Products Involved in Price War, XrN MIN WAN BAO (Sept. 16,
2001), at http://news.fm365.com/caijing/caijinga/20010916/390658.shtml.
77 For example, Kodak's merger with two Chinese firms in 1998 led to its 70% market
share in film products in 2001. See Perspectives of Mergers of Chinese Firms by Foreign
Investors (working paper by MOFTEC), at http://www.moftec.gov.cn/article/200302/
20030200071550_1.xml (Feb. 27, 2003).
78 State Economic & Trade Commission: Guidelines of the Industry Structure Adjust-
ment for the Tenth Five-Year Plan, October 2001.
79 The three regulations were adopted on Oct. 31, 2001 and became effective on Jan. 1,
2002.
80 See Youngjin Jung, China's Aggressive Legalism-China's First Safeguard Measure,
36 J.W.T. 1037 (2002).
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an antimonopoly law, especially the fight against administrative monopoly,
may well create a better environment for the multinational firms to compete
more effectively in China's market.
8 1
III. A THIRD-WAY: SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY
Around the world today, 100 countries have established competition
laws or antitrust laws 82 as well as enforcement institutions, to promote eco-
nomic efficiency by protecting competition in the market.83 Although every
country has its own version of competition law, competition regimes can be
divided into two prototypes: the U.S. Model and the E.U. Model. There
are several distinctive characteristics for each model.
First, the U.S. Model is court-oriented, whereas the E.U. Model is
more administrative agency-oriented. In the United States, a variety of ac-
tors actively participate in court proceedings to enforce antitrust laws. For
instance, private parties motivated by such incentives as a treble damages
system aggressively pursue their interests in court proceedings. The Anti-
trust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), a major criminal
antitrust enforcement agency, along with the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"), which enforces civil antitrust laws, discharges its statutory re-
sponsibilities by pursuing criminal cases through court proceedings. Sec-
ond, profoundly influenced by scholars of the so-called Chicago School,84
the U.S. model is more prone to promote exclusive economic efficiency as
the objective of competition law, 85 while the E.U. model pursues more di-
81 A greater enforcement of competition law may result in an increase in market access.
For the implications of competition law on market access, see Eleanor M. Fox, Toward
World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1997).
82 See OECD Secretariat, Optimal Design of a Competition Policy (submitted to the
Global Forum on Competition held on February 10-11, 2003), at http://www.oecd.org/
pdf/M00038000/M00038298.pdf (last visited on Feb. 11, 2003).
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); RORBER H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (2d ed. 1993); Richard A. Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
85 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1 (2d ed. 2000).
Today it seems clear that the general goal of the antitrust law is to promote 'competition' as the
economist understands that term. Thus we say that the principal objective of antitrust policy is to
maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave competitively, while yet permitting
them to take advantage of every available economy that comes from internal or jointly created pro-
duction efficiencies, or from innovation producing new processes or new or improved products.
However, there are many who criticize this view. See Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to
Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anti-competitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371,
374-80 (2002); F.M. Scherer, Some Principles of Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 5 (2001); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective
and Prospective: Where are We Coming from? Where are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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verse or inclusive objectives such as market integration, small and medium-
sized firms, and fair competition.8 6 Third, the founders of each system had
different views of the term "bigness" in the context of competition law. As
far as statutory languages go, U.S. antitrust law would suppose that the state
of monopoly itself could be condemned, where European Community
("EC") competition law posits that one should be subject to discipline only
when one abuses a dominant position. The drafters of EC competition law
imported this concept from German Competition Law. The term "bigness"
was not an imminent problem to the EC drafters. Rather, they were of the
view that corporations in the Community were too small and fragmented,
especially compared to U.S. companies, to face international competition. 87
With its long history and rich precedents, the U.S. Model has been
used as a yardstick by many other nations. In China, U.S. antitrust law has
been extensively discussed.88 Nevertheless, the E.U. Model appears to be
gaining momentum throughout the world. Recent years have witnessed the
E.U. Model's frequent adoption by most transitional economies for the rea-
sons set out below. 89 China also follows the E.U. Model in its basic struc-
ture and legal setting.
First, the civil law traditions of countries emulating the E.U. Model
greatly affect the decision of which model to follow. Because China is not
equipped with a well-developed judicial review system, the Chinese gov-
ernment would have found it very difficult to adopt the U.S. antitrust sys-
tem. The legal tradition of a country oftentimes overcomes semantic
differences between the U.S. and E.U. Model. For instance, the legislative
history shows that Japan has adopted the U.S. Model because the U.S.
936 (1987); William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and
the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins
of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT'L. REV. L. & EcON. 73, 74-76 (1985);
Gordon B. Spivak, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly
Power: A Response, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 651 (1983); Louis B. Schwartz, Justice and Other
Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1976); Eleanor M. Fox, The
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981) (harmo-
nizing nonefficiency goals with efficiency goals); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Frame-
work for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 220 (1979); Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-
History ofAntitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 163 (1990).
86VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE 10-11 (6th ed. 1997).
87 See Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. and E. U. Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL
COMPETITION POLICY 339, 343-44 (Edward M. Gram & J. David Richardson eds., 1997).
88 See, e.g., Xue Zhaofeng, Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC
REPORT (Mar. 12, 2001), at http://www.stevenxue.com.
89 See Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting Room-Why
Must the Central European Nations Adopt the Competition Law of the European Union?, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 351 (1997).
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planted its own version of antitrust law into the Japanese legal system,90 but
even some of the elements similar to U.S. antitrust law are practiced in line
with the continental civil law tradition. As China is commonly classified as
having a civil law tradition, it is quite natural that it has shown a penchant
for the E.U. Model.
Second, since China's Constitution proclaims that it pursues a socialist
market economy, China cannot adopt the objective of U.S. antitrust law,
which many courts and scholars believe has "economic efficiency" as its
exclusive goal. Article 1 of the Draft states "[t]his law is enacted for the
purposes of prohibiting monopoly, safeguarding fair competition, protecting
the legal rights of business operators and consumers, and the public interest,
and to ensure the healthy development of the socialist market economy."
Apart from the language "prohibiting monopoly," all the other elements Ar-
ticle 1 enumerated as goals of the Draft clearly deviate from "economic ef-
ficiency," the goal of U.S. antitrust law.
Third, China is not confronted with the "bigness" problem. Rather, the
Chinese government believes that Chinese companies are too small and too
vulnerable to foreign competition. Thus, it is quite understandable that the
Chinese government followed the E.U. Model and adopted the scheme of
"abuse of dominant position."
Chinese competition law also greatly resembles German competition
law. This is because German competition law has a large number of so-
phisticated provisions which are thought to have had a significant impact on
the drafting of E.U. competition law. 91 One commentator advocates the
values and ideas (so-called "ordoliberalism") that underlie German compe-
tition law to those of post-socialist countries. 92 Many provisions of German
competition law lend themselves to situations in the Chinese socio-political
economy because German competition law pursues neither a pure capitalist
market economy nor pure socialism.
93
Despite these similarities, China follows neither the E.U. nor German
prototypes exactly. China distinguishes itself from both, for example, by
addressing administrative monopoly, its paramount concern. In this re-
spect, the Chinese draft legislation has much in common with other East
Asian neighboring countries such as Korea and Japan. They contain in their
90 JoHN 0. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN 52-63 (2001).
91 See David J. Gerber, Law & Competition In Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting
Prometheus, 6 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 259, 263 (2000) (book review commenting on Germany's
completion of almost a decade of debates over competition, and its passing of Europe's first
modem competition statute).
92 See David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Com-
petition Law and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. CoMp. L. 25, 28-52 (1994) (Ordoliberalism
had a profound impact in laying out the foundation for German competition law. Unlike
pure liberalism advocated by such intellectuals as Friedrich von Hayek, it recognizes the
need for the state to play a major role in maintaining the conditions of competition.).
9 Id. at 79-80.
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competition laws a very4 unique set of provisions that deals with the issue of
general concentration. For instance, Korean and Japanese competition
laws contain provisions restricting cross-share holding and holding compa-
nies.95 Competition law is not merely legislation related to economics, but
is at the heart of the broader socio-economic system in each country; thus,
the laws are carefully crafted to address the most important economic prob-
lems in each country. China, for example, has problems with administra-
tive monopoly, while Korea and Japan have problems with industrial
business conglomerates, Chaebol, and prewar Zhaibatsu/postwar
Keitetsu,97 respectively.
The specific focus on administrative monopoly in the Draft demon-
strates that China is striving to lead its economic system from a centrally-
planned to a market-oriented system. The successful transition from a cen-
tralized economic system to a market economy requires a massive amount
of privatization and exposes state-owned companies to competitive market
forces. A tough stance toward administrative monopoly is the first positive
step toward a more competitive market environment in China because, as a
former communist country, the regulatory legal monopoly is widely preva-
lent. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") advocates the idea of combating administrative monopoly with
regulatory reform. 98 In fact, a sufficient regulatory reform should precede
competition enforcement, since the latter is supposed to be applied to pri-
vate anticompetitive behaviors. This is a daunting task. However, China's
initiatives to crack down on administrative monopoly are more focused on
integrating fragmented national markets. In the U.S., the dormant com-
merce clause under the U.S. Constitution was employed to integrate the na-
tional market. In the E.U., other potent legal instruments, such as trade
policies, prohibition of quantitative restrictions, and non-discrimination
94 Korea's Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Chapter 3: Restrictions on Busi-
ness Combinations and Economic Concentration; Japan's Act Concerning the Prohibition of
Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Chapter IV: Stockholdings, Interlocking
Directorates, Merger and Acquisitions.
95 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act Ch. 3 (S. Korea), translated in 8 STATUTES
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Korean Legislation Research Institute, 2001); Act Concerning
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Ch. 4 (Japan), translated in
Carl J. Green and Douglas E. Rosenthal, COMPETITION REGULATION IN THE PACIFIC RIM 239-
244 (1996).96 See generally EDWARD M. GRAHAM, REFORMING KOREA'S INDUSTRIAL
CONGLOMERATES (2003).
97 For a general explanation of Keiretsu, see Akira Goto & Kotaro Suzumura, Keiretsu:
Interfirin Relations in Japan, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
MODALITIES FOR COOPERATION 361-78 (Leonard Waverman et al. eds., 1997).
98 See OECD, Introduction on Regulatory Reform, at http://www.oecd.org/EN/about/0,
EN-about-2-nodirectorate-no-no-no-2,00.html (last visited June 8, 2003).
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principles, have been used extensively to accelerate the integration of the
E.U. market into the E.U. competition law regime.
With a single competition law, the Chinese government is attempting
to achieve two objectives: integration of a national market and realization
of a competitive market. The Draft is a good manifestation of all-out efforts
by the Chinese government to clamp down on anticompetitive behaviors in
the market, which requires cooperation from all levels of its society. Article
7 of the Draft codifies the government's expectation of such cooperation:
"[t]he State encourages, supports and protects social supervision of monop-
oly by all organizations and individuals."
This is a very ambitious project and quite an innovation for competi-
tion law. Competition law is traditionally perceived as dealing with only
private anticompetitive behaviors. China is taking the additional legislative
actions required to address government-based monopolies. In this sense,
China's competition regime will consist of an economic constitution, which
overrides other laws and regulations that hinder the creation of an effective
competitive market. It is unclear how such a novel notion will play out,
particularly given the fact that all statutes have equal weight and status.
Clearly, Chinese competition laws are pursuing a non-traditional third way
in the name of realizing a socialist market economy.
IV. CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY REGULATIONS
A. Formative Years of China's Competition Regulations
As early as 1980, the State Council promulgated the Transient Provi-
sions on the Development and Protection of Socialist Competition,99
China's first legal document on competition. With the benefit of hindsight,
one can easily identify the contradictions in this competition policy, due to
the constraints of its underlying ideology. This regulation tried to introduce
a maximum degree of competition into the planning system. For example,
although it acknowledged that necessary adjustments should be made to the
pricing system in order to effectuate competition, it also stipulated that the
enterprises needed to apply for government approval to raise prices. Fur-
thermore, the regulation stated that prices of designated key products must
remain "stable." While it encouraged technology development and com-
mercial transfer, the regulation also urged enterprises to engage in
technology exchange in the spirit of socialist co-operation.' 0 '
99 Promulgated on October 17, 1980. See Transient Provisions on the Development and
Protection of Socialist Competition, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, No. 487,
available at http.foreignlawguide.com/FLG/frameset.htm.
l°°Id. at art. 5.
101 Id. at art. 7.
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The most significant provision in this legislation, and the earliest at-
tempt to address administrative monopoly was Article 6, which prohibited
"regional blockade" and "department fragmentation."'10 2 But overall, the
regulation was toothless without any implementing mechanism. Instead of
enforcement institutions, legal remedies or sanctions, the legislation re-
quired involved regions and departments to implement detailed measures.
In 1993, the Law of the People's Republic of China for Countering Un-
fair Competition ("LCUC") was enacted. Rather than incorporating a sepa-
rate anti-monopoly law, several anti-monopoly provisions were inserted
into the LCUC. Article 6 of the LCUC prohibited public utility operators or
other monopolies from imposing transactions in order to eliminate competi-
tors. 10 3 Article 11 forbade setting predatory prices; 104 Article 15 prohibited
collusion in bidding; 10 5 Article 7 explicitly opposed administrative monop-
oly in the form of forced transactions and local protectionism. 106 In relevant
provisions, the LCUC stipulated legal liabilities and sanctions of those mo-
nopolistic activities (except the predatory price in article 1 1).117 Although
the term 'anti-monopoly' is avoided, the LCUC addresses certain forms of
restrictive agreement, abuse of dominant market position, and administra-
tive monopoly.
The LCUC authorized the SAIC and its local branches ("AICs") to act
as enforcement institutions. This was particularly important for enforcing
its anti-monopoly provisions, because SAIC has the ability to pass regula-
tions to implement the general terms used in the LCUC, substantiating
those provisions and maximizing their applicability in practice. Over the
years, SAIC enacted and issued numerous regulations and circulars, includ-
ing: Provisions on Prohibiting Restrictive Activities on Competition by
Public Utility Enterprises, 10 8 Reply on the Definition of Illegal Acts and
Calculation of Illegal Earnings under Article 23 of LCUC, 10 9 Reply on the
Nature of Restrictive Measures by the Travel Administration, and Unrea-
sonable Charges by the Travel Agencies. 10 This body of legislation consti-
tutes the real operating rules in combating the specified monopolistic
activities under the LCUC. Thus, under LCUC and its ramifications, the
102 Id. at art. 6. Article 6 states that "[n]o region or department is allowed to blockade the
market, or prohibit the sale of commodities from other regions in the local market or within
the department."
103 Law of the People's Republic of China Against Unfair Competition, Art. 6 (1993)
(P.R.C), translated in 4 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BusrNEss: BUSINESS REGULATION (1999).
'
10Id. at art. 11.
'
05 Id. at art. 15.
106 Id. at art. 7.
107 Id. at arts. 23, 27, 30.
108 SAIC Order # 20, Dec. 24, 1993.
'09 SAIC (1999) 310, Nov. 29, 1999.
110 SAIC (2000) 245, Oct.17, 2000.
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Chinese government set up a narrow and limited de facto competition
mechanism.
Although some jurisdictions, such as Taiwan,II combine restrictions
against monopoly and unfair competition together under one law, China's
current competition structure does not, and thus fails as a complete and ef-
fective competition regime. Furthermore, as will be detailed later, institu-
tional and legal limitations have developed since its establishment, which
has reduced its strength to the point of paralysis. With rapidly mounting
pressure for an anti-monopoly law, China's competition structure has be-
come patently inadequate and desperately in need of an overhaul for the fol-
lowing reasons.
The leeway left by the LCUC as a compromise to accommodate con-
flicting interests that has obviously backfired. According to Article 3,
SAIC and AICs of the governments above county level are the enforcement
institutions, but "where laws or administrative rules and regulations provide
that other departments shall exercise supervision and inspection, those pro-
visions shall apply." This in effect allows any other department in the gov-
ernment unchecked exemption to the application of the LCUC, and gives
them a share of the anti-competition enforcing power. Indeed, quite a few
departments notoriously engage in administrative monopoly, taking advan-
tage of this inviting opportunity. For example, the China Civil Aviation
Bureau, Ministry of Information Industry, People's Bank, and Ministry of
Justice have adopted regulations and taken over power to regulate monopo-
listic activities in their sphere of influence.1 2 Those regulations severely
spoil the effect of anti-monopoly provisions under the LCUC.
As the LCUC is limited in scope and its implementing regulations have
little authority, anti-monopoly provisions have appeared in legislation be-
yond the reach of the LCUC. An example is the Price Law passed in
1997."' Article 14 of the Price Law forbids "unfair pricing activities," such
as collusion to manipulate market price, to impair the interests of other
business operators or consumers, to sell products below costs in order to
eliminate competitors or monopolize the market, or to offer the same prod-
ucts or services at discriminative prices. 1 4 The Price Law grants enforce-
ment power to "price administrations above county level." As China has
enacted more laws to modernize its legal system, the number of such com-
111 Lawrence L.C. Lee, Taiwan's Antitrust Statutes: Proposals for a Regulatory Regime
and Comparison of U.S. and Taiwanese Antitrust Law, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 583
(1996).
112 See generally Regulations Against Unfair Competition in the Civil Air Transportation
Market, Feb. 27, 1996 (P.R.C.), available at http://qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw94.htm (last modi-
fied May 1, 1998); Telecommunication Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Sept.
25, 2000 (P.R.C.) translated in 4 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS: BuSINESS
REGULATION, supra note 103.
11 Enacted in 8th NPC Standing Committee 29th Session, Dec. 29, 1997.
114 Price Law arts. 14.1, 14.2 and 14.5.
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petition provisions has increased." 5 To complicate the legislative chaos,
different authorities have issued directives, interpretations and circulars at
all levels, with diverging effects. Without a single "umbrella scheme," the
widely-dispersed competition provisions have given rise to inconsistencies,
contradictions and enforcement difficulties.
The SAIC and local AICs, as primary enforcement agencies, have
proven to be weak. The AICs at all levels are part of the executive branch
and lack the independence and authority necessary to be effective. Not only
are they often challenged by contradictory regulations adopted by other de-
partments, but others often interfere with their investigations and obstruct
their enforcement. 1
6
The State Council, in an attempt to empower the AICs to better combat
monopoly, upgraded the SAIC to a Ministerial level in April 2001.117 This
has had little effect, revealed in a recent case in Fangchenggang of Guangxi
province. In early 2003, three local government departments jointly issued
a circular, requiring gas users to buy designated burners before the end of
June. Alarmed by a high number of public complaints, the mayor inter-
vened and the circular was repealed. Meanwhile, the local AIC played no
role other than an advocate of relevant LCUC provisions to the mayor and
involved departments.' 1 8 Consultations and coordination are still the work-
ing rule of the Chinese government, and AICs inherently lack the leverage
to prevail in carrying out many of their anti-monopoly missions.
Under the current system, legal sanctions are rarely effective. For ex-
ample, although setting predatory prices is prohibited by Article 11 of the
LCUC, no corresponding sanction is provided, which deprives it of its en-
forceability. Under Article 23, AICs can impose fines of RMB 50,000-
200,000 (roughly between $6,040 and $24,155) on a public utility enter-
prise or other monopoly for restricting consumers to purchasing certain des-
ignated commodities. Such a range is normally only a fraction of the
115 See Law on Bidding and Inviting Biddings Arts. 6 and 32, Aug. 30, 1999 (P.R.C)
("'[Blidders shall not collude each other in a tender' and no bidding or bidding-inviting shall
be subject to local or department intervention."); see also Regulations on Administration of
Import and Export of Technologies Art. 29, Oct. 31, 2001 (P.R.C.) (prohibiting certain re-
strictive clauses in technology import contracts, including clauses imposing conditions to
purchase "unnecessary technologies, raw materials, products, equipment or services,"
clauses requiring the assignee or licensee to obtain similar to or competitive technologies
from other sources, and clauses "unreasonably restricting the channels or sources for the as-
signee or licensee to purchase raw materials, spare parts, products or equipment").
116 See, e.g., Zhou Yan, Further Perfecting the Legal System of Competition in China by
Antimonopoly Legislation, at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/about/apec/advocacy/China.pdf.
17 See SAIC Upgraded to Combat Industry Monopoly (April 11, 2001), at
http://www.sinolaw.net.cn/zhuanti/fld/hgbdlbd19.htm.
118 See Liao Kaijun et al., Monopoly by Power: Three Departments Assigned Products,
GUANG ZHENGFA BAO (March 4, 2003), available at http://www.gxnews.com.cn/news/
20030304/gxxw/091636.htm.
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profits made by those enterprises and thus can hardly deter them from vio-
lating the statute. When an administrative monopoly violates Article 7 of
the LCUC, its Article 30 only requires administrative agencies at a higher
level to "make corrections." Even if "the circumstances are serious," the
higher agency may only impose internal administrative sanctions on the of-
ficials directly responsible. Neither the AICs nor the victims injured by
monopolistic activities can challenge those decisions.
B. The Draft of China's Anti-Monopoly Act
The Draft is composed of eight chapters and 58 articles. It is notable
that the Draft contains a series of provisions to address "abuse of adminis-
trative powers,"" 9 in addition to abuse by private enterprises of dominant
position monopolies. The Draft also contains a very strong enforcement
mechanism, working in conjunction with the LCUC, explained supra, as
part of a total competition regime. The Draft does not have provisions for
"unfair trade practices" in a strict sense, such as those provided in Korea
and Japan's competition laws, which were supposedly influenced by Article
5 of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act.120  Both countries also
adopted discrete laws for "unfair trade practices" outside their narrowly-
defined competition laws, modeled after the German Unfair Trade Law.
12 1
The concept of "unfair trade practices" is nebulous. At the minimum,
the regulation of "unfair trade practices" is to protect "fairness in competi-
tion process" or "fair competition" so as to include even competitors as its
object. As such, in transactions between interested parties, unfair trade
laws regulate practices that have less direct effects on the market itself than
on the process. Because the competition law system regulates abuse of the
dominant position, inclusion of unfair practices law in competition law may
create overlapping regulations against unfair trade practices. In this respect,
it is understandable that in following the principles of the German competi-
tion regime, China addresses unfair trade practices separately in the LCUC,
not in the Draft.
122
119 See Chapter Five of the Draft, "Prohibition of Administrative Monopoly."120 Id. at art. 5(a)(1) ("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.").
121 Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerbs ("UWG"), translated in BusINEss
TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY (Dennis Cambell, Christian Campell, & Bernard Ruster, eds.,
1983).
122 Some scholars argue that the structure of Korea's competition law should be reconsid-
ered because it has provisions on abuse of dominant position as well as lengthy "unfair trade
practices." OHSEuING KWON, WIRTSCHATSRECHT 311 (4th ed. 2002).
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1. Territorial Scope
Following the model of the German Competition Law, 123 the Draft ex-
plicitly recognizes the possibility that China's law can be applied outside
the territory of China.'12 The drafters may have believed that since the ex-
traterritorial application of competition law is common in major countries
such as the United States and the European Union, it would be appropriate
to codify the basic principle of extraterritoriality of competition law.
Indeed, the International Antitrust Guidelines, which were promul-
gated in 1995 by the U.S. antitrust authorities, the DOJ and FTC, refer to an
"effect" doctrine, stating that "anticompetitive conduct that affects U.S.
domestic or foreign commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust laws regard-
less of where such conduct occurs or the nationality of the parties in-
volved.' 25  The Guidelines refer to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1993
decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California26 and state that "im-
ports into the United States by definition affect the U.S. domestic market
directly, and will, therefore, almost invariably satisfy the intent requirement
of the Hartford Fire test. Whether they in fact produce the requisite sub-
stantial effects will depend on the facts of each case.' ' 127 For instance, when
a cartel formed by foreign producers with no U.S. subsidiaries or produc-
tion has raised the prices of products, the substantial sales of which, both in
absolute terms and relative to total U.S. consumption, have been imported
into the United States, U.S. enforcement agencies would find Sherman Act
jurisdiction in line with the International Antitrust Guidelines because of an
intended and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.1
28
The European Union employs the "implementation" test adopted by
the European Court of Justice. 129 This test produces a similar outcome to
123 Law Against Restraints of Competition Art. 130(2) (Sept. 24, 1980) (F.R.G) trans-
lated in LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION WITH 1980 AMENDMENTS (Alexander
Riesenkampff & Joachim Gres trans., 1980) [hereinafter "GWB"] (stating that "[t]his Act
shall apply to all restraints of competition having an effect within the area of application of
this Act, also if they were caused outside the area of application of this Act").
124 Article 2 of the Draft states that "(t]his Law shall apply to behavior outside the terri-
tory of the People's Republic of China that violates provisions of this Law and limits or af-
fects domestic market competition within the territory of the PRC."
125 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND THE FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (April 1995) § 3.11.
126 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
127 INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, § 3.11 (Oct. 1994); see also Caribbean
Broad. Sys. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the For-
eign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 conferred jurisdiction over a foreign radio
station's complaint alleging anticompetitive conduct by another foreign radio station based
on injuries to U.S. advertisers).
128 INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 127, at Illustrative Example A.
129 Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A.
Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988).
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the "effects" test employed in the United States.130 Articles 81(1) and 82 of
the Treaty of Rome prohibit certain conduct that may affect trade between
Member States and has an anticompetitive effect "within the Common
Market": the former requirement is fulfilled whether the effect is direct or
indirect, actual or potential. 31 However, the tests in both systems are dif-
ferent. According to the E.U., in the "appreciable" effect test, the effects
must be more than "de minimis" or "perceptible." However, in the United
States, such effects must be "substantial," 132 more stringent than the E.U.
"appreciable" standard.
The foregoing discussions are only the very first threshold question to
be answered in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a concept gener-
ally known as subject matter jurisdiction.' 33 Even if such a test is passed
and subject matter jurisdiction is found, a country intent on extraterritorial
application of competition law should pass another hurdle such as personal
jurisdiction, 134 judicial service, and so on. t35  Most importantly, such a
country must find the foreign conduct at issue has violated any of the sub-
stantive provisions of its competition law. Essentially, when a country ap-
plies competition law extraterritorially, it imposes its own substantive
competition model on foreign countries with a different economic system.
As such, it is much more likely that a country that has a more mature com-
petition market would be willing to exercise its competition law over con-
duct taking place in foreign countries with less-developed competition
markets. It remains to be seen whether China will aggressively exercise its
competition law over foreign anticompetitive behaviors, but one cannot rule
130 Compare Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, The Justice
Department's Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, Address Be-
fore the International Trade Section and Antitrust Committee of the D.C. Bar (Nov. 29,
1988) with Sir Leon Brittan, Jurisdictional Issues in E.E.C. Competition Law, Hersch Lau-
terpacht Memorial Lectures, Cambridge (Feb. 8, 1990) (In Wood Pulp, "the Court did not
endorse the effects doctrine."). Apparently, the Community's jurisdiction to apply its com-
petition rules to conducts outside the E.U. market is covered by the (objective) territorial
principle, as universally recognized in public international law.
131 Case 56/65, Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R.
235, 248, 5 C.M.L.R. 357, 375 (1966); Case 61/60, Cooperative Stremsel-en Kleurselfabriek
v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 851, 867 (1981)
132 Case 5/69, Volk v. Vevaecke, 1969 E.C.R. 295, 302, 1 C.M.L.R. 273, 282 (1969);
Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1986 O.J. (C 231) 2, as amended,
1994 O.J. (C 368) 20 and 1997 O.J. (C 372) 13.
133 It is a question of whether a country has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of
law governing persons and conduct beyond national borders.
134 Even if subject matter jurisdiction exists, a country cannot exercise its jurisdiction
without personal jurisdiction. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945), the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process "requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
135 ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENT 2, 1176-1201 (5th ed. 2002).
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out the possibility that China may do so given the recent showing of its
"aggressive legalism." 136
2. Prohibition ofAdministrative Monopoly
Ironically, administrative monopoly, though the most important cata-
lyst behind China's antimonopoly law, is not a commonly-found element in
other countries' competition laws, and is particularly absent in developed
economies. Even in comparison with competition laws of other transitional
countries that have similar regulations, China's efforts to curb governmen-
tal anticompetitive actions in Chapter Five of the Draft are far-reaching and
ambitious. Unlike other competition regimes, where private monopolies are
the main target of enforcement agencies, administrative monopoly in China
constitutes the most destructive barrier to the formation of an orderly mar-
ket, as it encourages other types of monopolistic activities, such as abuse of
dominant position and cartels. More importantly, it reflects the recurring
problem Chinese reformers have continuously strived-and failed-to
solve: to harness administrative power and replace direct administration of
economy with legal rules. The various constraints in China's current stage
of development, however, render the prohibitive measures on administra-
tive monopolies less potent than they appear.
Under the Draft, the term "administrative monopoly" is used to refer to
anticompetitive activities by governments and their subordinate depart-
ments who abuse their administrative power through industry monopoly
and regional monopoly.1 37 Chapter five divides these two types of adminis-
trative activities into five categories of prohibited government actions: (1)
discriminatory practices that force purchases from certain business opera-
tors or restricting other business operators' legal business activities under
Article 31; (2) regional monopolies, which limit inflow of products into the
local market or outflow of local products to other markets using all kinds of
proscribed means under Article 32; (3) department and industry monopo-
lies, which limit operators from entering into the markets of particular in-
dustries and eliminate or restrict market competition under Article 33; (4)
the compulsion of business operators to take actions to eliminate or restrict
market competition prohibited by the Draft under Article 34; and (5) the en-
actment of regulations that eliminate or limit competition to obstruct fair
competition under Article 35.
While state or government actions sometimes inflict deleterious distor-
tion on competition, most countries do not address this problem primarily
through competition law. In a sense, the notion of civil or criminal en-
forcement by one government department against another government de-
partment does not appear to be consistent with the notion of the government
136 Jung, supra note 80.
137 The Draft, supra note 6, at Art. 3(4).
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as a single entity. For instance, the Japanese Act Concerning the Prohibi-
tion of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, as its title reveals,
openly set its scope against only "private monopolization." Competition
enforcement is often impeded when private anti-competitive actions are the
result of government collaboration. Starting in World War II, a pattern of
close cooperation developed between Japanese business and Japanese gov-
ernment. To enforce "industrial policy," Japan's administrative agencies,
notably the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"), rou-
tinely provided "administrative guidance" through informal persuasion that
effectively induced voluntary cooperation of private companies. 139 For ob-
vious reasons, this created thorny problems for competition law enforce-
ment. For example, as part of a 1980 landmark decision by the Tokyo High
Court that imposed the most severe punishment on antitrust offenders, the
defendants in an output restriction case were still not convicted criminally,
based on the finding that their illegal activities were a result of close MITI
supervision and guidance, and under the erroneous assumption that their
conduct was not unlawful. 140 As such, widely-practiced state interference,
though in most cases not legally binding, is both beyond the reach of com-
petition law and serves as a defense to private competition law violations in
Japan.
Moreover, many, if not most, competition laws including German,
141
Japanese,142 and Korean1 43 versions have provisions explicitly exempting
actions by other government agencies from the scope of such laws. For in-
stance, Article 58 of the Korean competition law states "[t]his Act shall not
apply to the acts of an enterprise or an enterprisers organization conducted
in accordance with any Act or any decree to such an Act." Through this
type of exemption clause, competition authorities practically condone mo-
nopolistic acts of regulatory enterprises authorized by the legislations, not
to mention other abuses of authority by other government agencies respon-
sible for regulatory industries. However, China does not recognize such
138 HALEY, supra note 90, at 52.
139 See, e.g., James D. Fry, Struggling to Teethe: Japan's Antitrust Enforcement Regime,
32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 825 (2001).
140 See John 0. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions and Remedies: A Comparative Study of Ger-
man and Japanese Law, 59 WASH. L. REV. 471 (1984).
141 GWB, supra note 123, Chapter V ("Special Provisions for Certain Sectors of the
Economy").
142 Japan's Fair Trade Act, supra note 95, Chapter VI Exemptions; For a suggestion for
reconsideration of these exemptions clauses, see Toshiaki Takigawa, The Prospect ofAnti-
trust Law and Policy in the Twenty-First Century: In Response to the Japanese Antimonop-
oly Law and Japan Fair Trade Commission, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 275, 294-
298 (2002).
143 Korea's Fair Trade Act, supra note 95, Chapter XI Exemptions.
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blank exemptions in an apparent attempt to send an unambiguous signal to
other administrative bodies and related industries. 1
44
In the United States, the Supreme Court in 1943 established immunity
from antitrust liability under the state-action doctrine in Parker v. Brown.145
The Court concluded that the Congress had no intent in the Sherman Act to
"restrain state action or official action directed by a state." State agents act-
ing in furtherance of state policies and private parties acting on state law or
legal mechanisms are therefore immune from antitrust enforcement under
the Sherman Act. In its 1992 decision on FTC v. Tocor Title Insurance
Company,146 the Supreme Court applied the same principle to suits brought
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The establishment and develop-
ment of state-action immunity in antitrust enforcement reflects political
rather than economic considerations. As noted by the majority in Parker,
the court relied on principles of federalism in its conclusion. In Tocor, Jus-
tice Kennedy stressed that the purpose of the active state supervision in-
quiry was "not to determine whether the State has met some normative
standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices,.' 47  Nor is "the
question is [ ] how well state regulation works but whether the anticompeti-
tive scheme is the States' own."148 In the final analysis, the state-action ex-
emption is predicated by the necessity to preserve the State's own
administrative policies and the legitimate need to replace competition by
state regulation. Only actions taken by cities and municipalities that are not
acting to enforce state policies are subject to antitrust law.
To achieve the overriding goal of an open market, the European Union
is open to broader competition enforcement to curb state measures that dis-
tort free competition.' 49 The Spaak report, which preceded the Treaty of
Rome establishing the EC, expressly stated that the Commission might pro-
pose the removal of distortions of competition that create a real and serious
threat to the competition relations. 50 While in many cases it is hard to de-
termine whether state intervention has gone too far, several explicit provi-
sions on state actions were included in the Treaty of Rome ("EC
144 Following most competition regimes, the Draft exempts exercise of intellectual prop-
erty rights from its scope with some provision. As Article 56 of the Draft states, "This law is
not applicable to the conduct of business operators exploiting intellectual property in accor-
dance with the copyright law, trademark law, patent law and other laws protecting intellec-
tual property rights." The Draft, supra note 6, at Art. 56.
1n5 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
146 FTC v. Tocor Title Insurance Company, 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
147 id. at 634.
148 Id. at 635.
149 For a detailed discussion, see CARL MICHAEL VON QuIrzow, STATE MEASURES
DISTORTING COMPETITION IN THE EC (2001).
150 Id at 12.
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Treaty").1 51  It must be noted, however, as an inter-states institution, the
European Union can only aim to remove those measures that seriously
hamper integration of the different national markets. 
152
Generally speaking, it is common to assert that competitive concerns
over other government departments should be addressed by "deregulation"
programs or regulatory reform initiated by the central government. In re-
cent years, OECD has tried to bring attention to the importance of regula-
tory reform153 because driving out anticompetitive practice from the market
via competition law is not possible until sufficient regulatory reform is
achieved. For instance, the Korea Fair Trade Act has some provisions that
facilitate cooperation or coordination between Korea's Fair Trade Commis-
sion and relevant Ministries that have statutory authority to regulate certain
industries. 1
54
151 The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 renumbered the EC Treaty. Article 86 (1) prohibits
member states, when grant special or exclusive rights, enact or maintain any measure con-
trary to the rules of the Treaty, in particular those on competition. Article 87 forbids, subject
to exceptions, state aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods to the extent incompatible with the common
market. Procedural rules to regulate State aid are found in Articles 88 and 89. Articles 90-93
deal with distortions due to indirect discriminatory taxation. Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
152 VON QurTzow, supra note 149, at 8.
153 OECD, supra note 98.
154 Korea's Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, supra note 95, at Art. 3.2: "The
Fair Trade Commission may give opinions to the chief-officers of the appropriate adminis-
trative authorities as to the introduction of competition or other measures necessary to im-
prove market structures, where it appears to be necessary for the Commission to carry out
action plans ...." Article 63 ("Consultation on Enactment of Acts which Restrain Competi-
tion") also has elaborate provisions to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the
competition agency and other government agencies in charge of regulation. It states:
The chief-officer of the competent administrative authority shall seek, in advance, consultation
with the Fair Trade Commission, where he wishes to propose legislation or amend enactments con-
taining anti-competitive regulations such as restrictions on the fixing of prices or the terms of trans-
action, entry to markets, business practices, unfair collaborative acts, prohibited practices of an
enterpriser or an enterprisers organization, etc. and where he wishes to approve or make other meas-
ures involving anti-competitive factors against an enterpriser or an enterprisers organization.
The chief-officer of the competent administrative authority shall give, in advance, notice to the
Fair Trade Commission when he intends to enact or amend any rules or regulations involving anti-
competitive factors.
With regard to approvals or other measures involving anti-competitive factors under paragraph
(1), the chief-officer of the competent administrative authority shall give notice to the Fair Trade
Commission regarding the contents of the approval concerned or other measures.
In relation to notice under paragraph (2), where it is recognized that rules or regulations to be
enacted or amended contain anti-competitive provisions, the Fair Trade Commission may give ad-
vice to the chief-officer of the competent administrative authority as to the modification of such anti-
competitive provisions. This paragraph shall also apply to enactments made or amended without to
the Fair Trade Commission as prescribed by paragraph (1), Acts and subordinate statutes enacted or
amended without notice, approvals or other measures given without notice.
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Regarding regional monopolies, federal or quasi-federal entities (such
as in the United States and European Union, respectively) have employed
potent legal instruments other than competition law to cope with regional
monopoly. The United States has regulated regional monopolies undertaken
by States by virtue of the so-called "Dormant Commerce Clause., 155 In the
European Union, the nondiscrimination principle within the region has
greatly contributed to integrating a single market across the European Un-
ion.15 6 In other words, these federal or quasi-federal entities have cracked
down on regional monopolies primarily in reliance on trade policy tools
within the region rather than on a competition law framework. Competition
laws addressing regional monopolies are very limited.
By contrast, since China lacks federal or quasi-federal structures and
there are no trade policy tools within the country, the Chinese government
needs to devise an instrument by which the rampant administrative monop-
oly could be addressed. One could understand the provisions to address
administrative anticompetitive activities mentioned above only in terms of
the extraordinary circumstances that require measures beyond ordinary le-
gal instruments. As mentioned above, the biggest challenge China is facing
toward realizing effective competitive market is intransigent administrative
anticompetitive activities.
For these reasons, China assigns an extraordinary role to its competi-
tion law in combating government anticompetitive actions. Unlike the
United States and European Union, where antitrust and anti-competition
laws only apply vertically to regulatory activities by lower-level govern-
ment entities, the Draft also attempts to address competition barriers within
certain industries imposed by departments or ministries with equal legal
status in the eyes of the competition authority.
157
The Draft also distinguishes between violations committed by individ-
ual enterprises and government agencies. It imposes sanctions against gov-
ernment agencies separately from the enterprises that acted on their
mandate or support. In other countries such as the United States, antitrust
enforcement against private companies whose violations are based on gov-
ernment actions might only entail invalidating the disputed regulation. In
155 Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International Trade Law and the
Regulatory States: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurispru-
dence of the United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 139-166 (Thomas Cottier and
Petros C. Mavrodis eds., 2000).
156 Piet Eeckhout, After Keck and Mithouard: Free Movement of Goods in the EC, Mar-
ket Access, and Non-Discrimination, in REGULATORY BARRIERS, supra note 155, at 191-206.
157 According to Article 33 of the Draft, "The government and its subsidiary departments
shall not abuse their administrative power to compel business operators to take actions to
eliminate or restrict market competition that are prohibited under articles 2, 4 and 4 of this
law." The Draft, supra note 6, at Art. 33.
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some countries, competition law regulates state monopolies or enterprises
to reduce possible anticompetitive actions by the State. For example, the
German GBW is applicable to undertakings "entirely or partly in public
ownership . . .[which] are managed or operated by public authorities.,',
58
Article 31 of the EC Treaty deals with State monopolies in relation to
goods. According to the Draft, public and private enterprises are liable for
violations such as abuse of dominant position or concerted actions, while at
the same time, the responsible government actions will also induce liabili-
ties stipulated by the law.
Another noteworthy comparison is that the proscribed administrative
monopolistic activities often do not originate in the normal process of gov-
ernment regulation. The above-mentioned provisions in the EC Treaty tar-
get state-sponsored regulations or measures. In Japan, industrial policy
fostered by the government is viewed as conducive to the economy. How-
ever, in China administrative power is abused, therefore obstructing rather
than advancing state policies. This raises major concerns. For example,
Chinese policy makers have attempted to reduce departmental and regional
fragmentation since the early 1980s. The persisting fragmentation problem
finally led to Articles 32 and 33 of the Draft in order to undermine the
forces entrenching the fragmentation. In many cases, the government ac-
tions are plainly ultra vires. A recent case in point involves local education
authorities in Hancheng requiring all local school students to purchase milk
from a designated producer.159 While such abuse of public office is nor-
mally addressed in other countries by administrative law, ethics and disci-
plinary rules, it falls within the scope of anti-monopoly law in China.
Such broad scope and strict rules against administrative anticompeti-
tive activities, in a wider perspective, reflect China's governance crisis
while still a transitional economy. Although the government is urged to
regulate the economy by enforcing and complying with the law, there are
still no functional mechanisms to offer necessary constraints or incentives.
Old institutions and mentalities encourage rent-seeking by turning adminis-
trative power into a profitable resource. Government agencies are subject
only to self-discipline since no external constraints, such as effective judi-
cial review or public election, have been developed. As a result, private
competition has been smothered by suppressive and irregular government
practice. In this sense, the enforcement of administrative monopoly provi-
sions is primarily the creation and preservation of the basic conditions for a
competitive market order, a vital mission that is not needed in developed
market economies.
158 GWB, supra note 123, § 130(1).
159 See Shui Huo, Three Thousand Students In Haicheng were Poisoned by Milk Prod-
ucts, DA LIAN WAN BAO (April 8, 2003), available at http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2003-04-
08/0220985265.shtml.
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Similar conditions and problems in other transitional economies have
produced the same type of competition law provisions to prevent state bod-
ies from taking actions harmful to market competition. 16  The Ukraine,
with the broadest competition provisions on state actions, is the closest ana-
log to China.' 6  Article 6 of Ukraine's Law on Monopolism addresses
seven types of regulatory discrimination against enterprises by government
agencies or officials. Such illegal conduct is strikingly similar to the ad-
ministrative monopoly opposed by the Draft, covering entry barriers, forced
transactions, prohibition on goods or movement among regions, restraints
on specific enterprises, and other such activities.' 62
The ambitious goal of prohibiting administrative monopoly, however,
may not be so easily achieved. Since most of the anticompetitive actions
can be considered abuse of administrative power by definition and are al-
ready prohibited by law, simply putting them under the antimonopoly law
does not automatically lead to a cessation of anticompetitive activity. In
fact, the inclusion of administrative monopoly in the competition regime is
an indicator of the low efficacy of the other laws, particularly of the general
administrative law.
However, the sanctions refer to authorities outside the competition law
for enforcement. Other than the power of the AMAB to stop violations un-
der Article 48, other remedies rely on internal administrative procedure
(cancellation of illegal action or demotion and discharge) or criminal prose-
cution, provided it is available by criminal law. AMAB, as the competition
law enforcement agency, cannot initiate or be part of either of those proc-
esses. The enforcement of Chapter Five in the Draft can only expect to en-
counter more resistance. This is because, unlike the drastic political and
economic transformation in former socialist countries including Ukraine,
China's transition has been steering a gradual course, mainly in the eco-
160 See Roger Alan Boner, Antitrust and State Action in Transition Economies, 43
ANTITRUST BULL. 71 (1998).
161 See Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in Ukraine, 31 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 1 (1997).
162 Some differences between the two systems are evident. Ukraine's Article 6 lists seven
forms of specific conduct, while Article 35 in the Draft on anticompetitive regulation is
framed in general terms and subject to stretches in application. Furthermore, Article 6 also
provides exemption on the grounds of national security, defense and other public interests,
while the Draft does not allow for any exemption under Chapter Five. In the enforcement of
Article 6 in the Ukraine competition law, the usual remedy is simply a cease-and-desist or-
der. By contrast, the Draft devises multiple sanctions: under Article 47, for department mo-
nopolies, violation will be cancelled by a superior organization, responsible officials will be
demoted or discharged, and criminal sanctions may be evoked. For all other administrative
monopolies, Article 48 of the Draft authorizes the Anti-Monopoly Administration Body (the
"AMAB") to stop the violation in addition to the possibility of imposing internal administra-
tive and criminal penalties. Rules on government actions in the Draft appear even stricter
than that of Ukraine.
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nomic sphere. The intact political institutions pose a formidable resistance
to the economic reforms.
A difficult prospect, however, should not undermine the significance of
Chapter Five in the Draft. Strictly speaking, it will be the first piece of leg-
islation that sets direct limits on administrative power in economic regula-
tion. It also openly condemns administrative monopolies to appease public
discontent, which is exemplified by the unusual move by the drafters to as-
sure the public that "administrative monopoly" had been indeed included in
the Draft. 163 This will in turn enhance the public consciousness on the com-
petition cause and help with enforcement in the long run.
3. Prohibition of Cartels
(a) Application
Following the models of most jurisdictions, Chapter Two of the Draft
appears to enunciate that business operators entering into a "monopoly
agreement," broadly defined as any contract, agreement, or other collective
conduct to exclude or limit competition, are acting illegally. A combination
of specific categories and general proscription is used to set the parameters
of the prohibition. Six types of monopoly agreements are identified accord-
ing to Article 8, including price fixing of products; collusion in a tender;
limitation on production quantity; market allocation; limitation of the pur-
chase of new technology or new facilitates; and joint hindrance of transac-
tions. They are followed by a general catchall provision to prohibit "other
agreements with the effect of limiting competition."' However, the broad
range of exemption from cartel regulations gives rise to misgivings about
China's real commitment to uprooting hard-core cartels such as price-fixing
and market division.
In addition, problems may arise due to the application only to "busi-
ness operators." Article 4 of the Draft defines a business operator as a "le-
gal entity, other organization or individual that engages in product
production and sales or provision of services." Associations that do not en-
163 Administrative Monopoly Will Be Target in Antimonopoly Law Being Drafted,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Aug. 7, 2002, at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/law/
184667.htm.
164 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 8. According to Article 8, the following agreements
are exempted: "1. Joint action taken by business operators to improve technology, upgrade
product quality, improve efficiency, lower costs, unify product specifications and models
and to study in order to create products or markets; 2. Joint action taken by small and me-
dium size enterprises to improve operational efficiency and to enhance their competitive-
ness; 3. Joint action taken by business operators to adapt to market changes, to stop seriously
decreasing sales volumes or obvious productions surplus; 4. Joint action taken by business
operators to promote the rationalization of production operations, division of labor or the de-
velopment of specialization; 5. Other activities that may eliminate or limit competition, but
benefits national economic development and the public interest."
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gage in economic activities directly do not fall under the scope of the Draft.
In many other jurisdictions, associations are also forbidden to play any role
in the formation of anticompetitive agreements. Under section 1 of the
German GWB, "decisions by associations of undertakings" fall under the
rules on the prohibition of cartels. The competition laws of Korea, Japan
and Taiwan include "trade association" in their definitions of "enterprise ' 165
or set up separate provisions for "trade associations." Therefore, "trade as-
sociations" are clearly subject to the competition laws. 166 Trade and indus-
try associations are exerting increasing influence over the economic life of
China, notably in orchestrating concerted actions among enterprises. Fur-
thermore, many specialized ministries formerly supervising industries will
be transformed into national industry associations as part of the government
restructure. They are expected to retain substantial capacity to continue
anticompetitive practice but will not be subject to administrative monopoly
rules. It remains to be seen whether AMAB will regulate business associa-
tions by way of interpretation of the statutes.
Following the traditions of most countries, the Draft does not draw a
distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements as does the German
competition law. The favorable treatment for vertical agreements based on
economic theory is unlikely to influence AMAB, at least in the foreseeable
future. It is more likely to be explained below that AMAB will take more
seriously factors other than the competition element as defined by economic
theory. In some Central and Eastern European countries ("CEE coun-
tries"), 67 competition authorities have preferred to insure their ability to at-
tack certain vertical agreements in a market without dominant firms or in a
situation where dominance is hard to prove.' 68 However, authorities in
some of those countries, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland,
distinguish between horizontal and vertical agreements in their enforce-
ment.169 In China's case, when the economic reality demands it in the long
run, the provisions might be interpreted and tailored further to differentiate
the two types of relationships in enforcement because the statutory lan-
guages are created to be open-ended.
165 Republic of China Fair Trade Law, art. 2, translated at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/
roclawl3.htm.
116 Id. at arts. 7, 14-17.
167 See Russell Pittman, Competition Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Five Years
Later, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 179 (Spring 1998).
1681 d. at 184.
691 Id. at 185.
The New Economic Constitution In China
24:107 (2003)
(b) Exemption
The second part of Article 8 in the Draft provides exemptions for
agreements between enterprises. 170 In setting forth prohibitions and exemp-
tions in Article 8, the Draft does not explicitly declare any agreements to be
illegal per se, as the U.S. law does in prohibiting certain horizontal agree-
ments such as price-fixing and market division.
1 71
The structure of Article 8 suggests that competition authorities always
consider and weigh all applicable anticompetitive effects and overriding ef-
ficiencies and benefits of any agreement, particularly since both the pro-
scription and exemption are codified in a single provision. There is no
indication in the statutory language other than the word "exemption" that
elements enumerated under the name of "exemption" are really an excep-
tion to the general prohibition of cartels. In particular, one of the elements
for which exemption is to be made is open-ended, such that any activities
benefiting national economic development and the public interest could be
adjudged legal.
Some jurisdictions such as Germany, Korea and Japan provide for the
employment of several factors to invoke exemption from cartel regulations.
However, these countries do not use narrowly-tailored language to circum-
scribe the discretion of enforcement authorities or at least make clear that
invocation of exemption is allowed in exceptional and unusual situations.
The way the prohibition of cartels is enunciated in the Draft runs the risk of
subjecting all cartels or collusive behaviors to an open-ended requirement to
take into account any "other" factors. This case-by-case approach is similar
to the "rule of reason" application of which is entirely in the hands of
AMAB. Indeed, in many CEE countries, which similarly do not treat naked
cartels as illegal per se by statutory language, there has been a movement
toward more serious treatment for blatant cartel agreements. There is, in
fact, some such treatment of cartels in countries as Russia and Hungary. 
72
Nevertheless, the way the Draft treats cartels sends an ambiguous signal to
170 Those are joint actions that: (1) are taken to improve technology, upgrade product
quality, improve efficiency, lower costs, unify product specifications and models and to
study in order to create products or markets; (2) by small and medium size enterprises to im-
prove operational efficiency and to enhance competitiveness; (3) to adapt to market changes
to stop seriously decreasing sales volumes or obvious productions surplus; (4) to promote the
rationalization of production operations, division of labor or the development of specializa-
tion; and (5) other activities that may eliminate or limit competition but benefits national
economic development and the public interest.
171 See, e.g., U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (Supreme Court
upheld the lower court's instruction to the jury, in which price fixing or creating a price floor
under market was considered illegal per se); see also U.S. v. Topco Assoc. Inc., 405 U.S.
596 (1972) (Supreme Court held that in imposing territorial restrictions upon its members for
their selling of its products, the appellee's actions constituted horizontal restraints on trade
and were per se violations).172 See Pittman, supra note 167, at 45.
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business operators under its control, which would greatly undermine the ef-
fective enforcement of a nascent Chinese competition regime.
It is not clear from the language of the various laws whether parties to
an agreement must apply for exemptions. Under the German GWB, those
cartels and decisions under sections 2 to 4(1) "must be notified to the cartel
authority" in order to be exempted. 173 Agreements and decisions under sec-
tions 5-8 "may," upon application, be exempted by the cartel authority,
which means the notification is not a required obligation. Compared with
the clear language of the GWB, Article 9 of the Draft states that business
operators "can" apply to AMAB to determine whether agreements fall
within exemptions of Article 8. The interpretation of the term "can" is sig-
nificant. According to Article 44 of the Contract Law,' 74 whenever the law
requires such procedures as approval or registration, a contract shall not
take effect before such a procedure is completed. If the notification is con-
sidered an obligation, then non-compliance renders the agreement ineffec-
tive even if it would have been exempted. If it is not a required obligation,
the failure to notify AMAB of an agreement which later upon challenge is
found to qualify for exemption is not dispositive; the agreement is consid-
ered to have taken effect when it was concluded between the parties.
To apply for an exemption, business operators must submit required in-
formation to the AMAB within 15 days of the date of the conclusion of the
agreement. 75 The AMAB should make a decision on whether to approve it
within 60 days of receipt of the application; failure to reply within this pe-
riod is considered approval. 76 In granting an approval, the AMAB can im-
pose restrictive conditions to the agreement.' It is stipulated that the
approval should be of a limited term, but the length of the term or whether
such a term is renewable is not specified, like the practice in Germany.
178
The AMAB is granted significant power to revoke or modify the agreement
under certain circumstances. 179 However, the law does not provide the me-
chanics for the ongoing supervision necessary for the exercise of this
power.
173 GWB § 9 (1), supra note 123, at 19.
174 See Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (Oct. 1, 1999), translated at
http://www.cclaw.net/download/contractlawPRC.asp.
175 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 8.
176 Id. at art. 11.
177 id.
' GWB § 10(4), supra note 123, at 21.
179 See The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 12. The power applies to circumstances where (1)
major changes of economic situation occur; (2) the reason for the approval is invalidated; (3)
the business operators fail to observe additional obligations of the approval; (4) the agree-
ment is approved based on incorrect or misleading information; and (5) there is abuse of the
exemption. If the last three conditions apply, the revocation is retroactive. Id.
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(c) Sanctions
Upon finding a violation of the prohibitions of the monopoly agree-
ment under Article 8, the AMAB can order the parties to stop the violation,
and it may decide to fine the offender between one hundred thousand to five
million RMB. 180 In addition, according to Article 52 (5) of the Contract
Law, "violation of mandatory provisions of laws or administrative regula-
tions" renders the contract null and void. Therefore, another significance of
Article 8 is that it provides an important basis to nullify a contract or any
part thereof that entails anticompetitive effects.
4. Prohibition Against Abuse of a Dominant Position
(a) Prohibition
Chapter 3 of the Draft prohibits abuse of a dominant position. Accord-
ing to Article 14, "a business operator shall not abuse its dominant market-
ing position, obstruct the activities of other business operators, eliminate or
limit competition." The Draft adopts a standard similar to those used in
Germany and the European Union, as opposed to the U.S. standard, to ad-
dress monopolization. Article 14 follows a similar line as Section 19(1) of
the German GWB, which provides that "the abusive exploitation of a domi-
nant position by one or several undertakings shall be prohibited." Simi-
larly, the EC Treaty targets "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position" that is "incompatible with the common market." As
mentioned earlier, this position is understandable because Chinese corpora-
tions are so small and the market is so fragmented that the government may
target the abuse of corporations rather than the size of corporations as such.
However, it should be noted that U.S. antitrust law also does not con-
demn a monopoly per se. Despite the language of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, the judicial gloss on the section indicates that for there to be a violation
of the Section, a company must not only possess monopoly power, but also
commit a certain exclusionary act. In Grinnell, the U.S. Supreme Court has
required a second element: "the willful acquisition or maintenance of [mo-
nopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."'
82
Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the two systems in
their applications. 183 In the United States, the courts would find there to be
an exclusionary act only when such an act has reduced economic efficien-
180 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 44.
181 EC Treaty, supra note 151, at art. 82.
182 U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
183 Eleanor M. Fox, supra note 87 at 343-44. See also RENE JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION
AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT PosmoN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN
APPROACHES TO THE CONTROL OF ECONOMIC POWER (1970).
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cies by either raising prices or reducing output.184 In contrast, in the Euro-
pean Union, the courts and enforcement agencies could find abuse of a
dominant position even though there has not been an increase in price and
reduction in output.185 They would look at factors other than economic ef-
ficiencies so that they could take account of the "process" of competition.
As a result, the criterion "abuse of dominant position" is likely to result in a
more rigorous enforcement against exclusionary practices that hamper
competition there.
1 86
Furthermore, the types of remedies available to enforcement authorities
differ in the two systems. In the United States, as seen in Standard Oil v.
United States,187 United States v. AT&T Co.,' 88 and in the recent attempt by
the district court in United States v. Microsoft,189 enforcement authorities
can seek to divest a single company. 90 In contrast, in Germany or the
European Union, such a divestiture of single company is not allowed.
Given the lack of authority to divest "existing" single companies, it is safe
to conclude that the Chinese Draft follows the European Union or German
model. This means an enterprise may acquire and maintain a dominant po-
sition and use such a position in a nonabusive manner. It must be noted that
the GWB also opposes acquisition of market-dominating position in its
provisions of merger control; however, the concern over concentrations that
184 Fox, supra note 87.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For further historical accounts of the dis-
solution of the corporation, see GEORGE SWEET GIBB & EVELYN H. KNOWLTON, HISTORY OF
STANDARD OIL COMPANY (NEW JERSEY): THE RESURGENT YEARS 1911-1927 7-10 (1956).
"' U.S. v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affdsub nom. Md. v. U.S., 460
U.S. 1001 (1983). For the disintegration of the Bell System, see generally STEVE COLL, THE
DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T (1987).
189 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64-74 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated by 253 F.3d
34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that if the district court finds a causal connection
between divestiture exclusionary conduct and the company's position in the operating sys-
tems market, divestiture is still proper).
190 For a description of disappointment with decentralization policy, see POSNER, supra
note 84, at 101-117. The similar line of assessment of decentralization policy includes Wil-
liam E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the
Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1989) ("To most
students of antitrust, the history of Sherman Act deconcentration endeavors is largely a
chronicle of costly defeats and inconsequential victories."). See also WALTER ADAMS &
JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 198 (1987) ([T]he "government has since 1890 attacked and defeated
monopolies in courtrooms across the country. Yet despite some notable successes, Ameri-
can monopoly policy in practice has fallen short of its promise."); Frederick M. Rowe, The
Decline ofAntitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Econom-
ics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1537 (1984) ("Antitrust's Big Case is doomed to a tragic cycle: by
the time the barbecue is fit for carving, the pig is gone.")
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are expected to "create or strengthen a dominant position" in GWB 91 finds
no parallel anywhere in the Draft. A dominant market position is a given,
pre-existing fact which Article 14 and Chapter 3 presume in addressing the
anticompetitive acts facilitated by such a position.
In China, nearly all the monopolies or oligopolies now in dominating
position are those of large SOEs, most of which are in the process of priva-
tization, mostly in key infrastructure sectors such as public utility enter-
prises, public transport, and telecommunications. In fact, a predecessor
provision on dominant position traced back to the LCUC more explicitly
targets "public utility" companies. 192 Although Chapter 3 avoids singling
out those SOEs in order to have a broader application, currently no private
firms have been able to obtain monopoly power to warrant deliberation on
the desirability of certain monopolies. Similarly, none will be able to attain
such power in the forseeable future. It is anticipated that any private firms
with dominant market power will be former state monopolies. The acquisi-
tion of dominant market power is therefore a political decision beyond the
legal purview in China. Given the current economic situations there, the
provisions of abuse of dominant position are essentially expected to be used
to regulate anticompetitive acts of the monopolies or oligopolies present in
converted state firms. The AMAB is empowered to stop violations and im-
pose a fine between RMB ten thousand to ten million. The possibility of
criminal sanctions is not discussed.
193
(b) Defining "Dominant Position"
What constitutes a dominant position for competition law purposes in
China is a complex and important threshold question. The Draft's defini-
tion provides that a "dominant market position" is "one or several business
operators control[ling] a specific market." A "specific market" means the
territorial area affected during a specified time period by the sales of par-
ticular products by business operators. 194 A business operator is deemed to
have a dominant market position if any one of several listed conditions ex-
ist. 19 5 The Draft looks mainly at the number of enterprises and the extent of
competition in a market to determine market position. To establish domi-
nance and abuse, the relevant market (the product and geographic market)
should be defined. Given the lack of experience of defining a relevant mar-
191 GWB § 36(1), supra note 123, at 73.
192 Law of the People's Republic of China for Countering Unfair Competition, supra note
103, at art. 6.
193 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 45.
194 Id. at art. 4.
195 Those conditions are: (1) it is the sole business operator in a specific market and
makes it difficult for other business operators to enter into the market; (2) it occupies a supe-
rior status in a specific market and it is difficult for other business operators to enter into the
market; (3) despite the existence of more than two business operators in a specific market,
there is no actual competition among them. Id. at art. 15.
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ket, the AMAB will greatly benefit from operation of the Provisional Rules
currently in force on mergers and acquisitions because the issue of market
definition is similar in the two areas.
It remains to be seen how AMAB will interpret "dominant position."
As mentioned earlier, dominant position is different from monopoly power.
The concept of dominant position is less the economist's concept of power
over price than a legal concept. 196 In United Brands v. Commission, the
European Court of Justice held that a dominant position is "a position of
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competi-
tors, customers and ultimately of consumers."' 97 In Europe, it is understood
that economic strength is not necessarily synonymous with power over
price. The market share threshold, an important indicator for market domi-
nance, is substantially lower than in monopolization cases in the U. S. 19
8
To alleviate the administrative difficulties of determining market
dominance, the Draft follows the model of competition laws in countries
such as Germany, Korea, and Japan, and sets up statutory presumptions of
market dominance triggered by certain market shares. Market dominance is
presumed in cases where: (1) one business operator has a market share of
over one-half, (2) two business operators have a market share of over two-
thirds; or (3) three business operators have a market share of over three-
fourths. Yet the presumption is not automatic; AMAB has discretion to
presume market dominance.
The Draft's standards are comparatively high. Under the GWB, the
market share standards used are thirty-three percent for one undertaking,
fifty percent for three or fewer undertakings or sixty-six percent for five or
fewer undertakings. 199 Many CEE countries, which normally have inherited
from socialist systems higher industry concentration than China, have
adopted thirty percent as the market share criterion for dominance.
00
While this may raise fears in those countries that firms are unnecessarily
subject to competition office scrutiny and regulation, 20 1 China's decentral-
ized economy and the high market share threshold will lead to a high mar-
196 KORAH, supra note 86.
197 27/76 [1978] E.C.R. 207, 65.
198 In AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n (case C-62/86,1991 ECR 1-3359), the European
Court of Justice held that a 40% market share in the presence of significant barriers to entry
can constitute dominance, and a firm with 50% of a market or more is presumed to have
dominance. In the United States, for there to be market power, approximately a two-thirds
or more relevant market share is required.
199 GWB, supra note 123, § 19(3).2 0 0 Pittman, supra note 167.
201 Id.
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ket share threshold and lead to rare application and reduced strength of the
dominance-related provisions.
(c) Specific Types of Abusive Practices
Articles 17 to 24 specify eight forbidden abusive practices. 20 2 An im-
portant question is whether those Articles are meant to be an exclusive list;
in other words, the parameters of the prohibitions will have important ef-
fects on China's economy. The German GWB subdivided abuses of market
dominant position into a more general provision and various examples. °3
Abusive conduct not expressly mentioned in the examples, such as tying
practice, is still subject to scrutiny under the general provision to control
abuses and maintain an open market. Ambiguous as it may be, the Draft's
enumerated list should be viewed as exhaustive despite the general prohibi-
tion of abusive behaviors by business operators in dominant positions.20 4
Because Article 45 only places legal liabilities on eight specified abusive
behaviors, many types of abuses of dominant position will be placed out-
side the scope of the Draft.
Most abusive behaviors enumerated in the Draft are recognized as
unlawful in many jurisdictions.0 5 However, it should be noted that some
specified abusive behaviors are more commonly classified as collusive be-
haviors. For instance, prohibitions of resale price maintenance and territo-
rial market division are subsumed under vertical arrangements.20 6  Such
conduct without a dominant position may still be regulated by the provi-
sions prohibiting monopoly agreements in Section 2. It remains to be seen,
for example, how AMAB will treat resale maximum price maintenance by
an enterprise without a market dominant position.
It will also be interesting to see how AMAB will interpret a predatory
pricing provision, defined as selling products at prices below cost, as there
is no clear standard for "cost." Since even "average variable cost"-the so-
called Areeda-Turner standard2° 7-is hard to obtain,20 8 how AMAB will
202 They are: monopolistic high prices, predatory prices, discriminatory treatment, re-
fusal to deal, forced transactions, imposition of unreasonable transaction terms, exclusive
agreement, and fixing re-sale price.203 GWB, supra note 123, §19. According to the Draft's Article 19(1), the abusive ex-
ploitation of a dominant position by one or several undertakings shall be prohibited. The
GWB's section 19(4) contains examples of abusive conduct, including obstruction, exploita-
tion, discrimination, and denying access to essential facilities.
204 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 14 (a business operator shall not abuse its dominant
marketing position, obstruct the activities of other business operators, eliminate or limit
competition).205 A.B.A. Section Of Antitrust Law, 1 COMPETITION LAW OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
(2001), at 48-49.
206 Id., at Vol. 2, at 32-34.
207 Phillip Areeda and Donald F.Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975).
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conduct investigation into a predatory pricing case remains a question be-
cause it has little experience with complicated economic inquires.
The other interesting point is the way in which unilateral refusal to deal
is structured. Unlike other abusive behaviors enumerated in the Draft, the
provision on unilateral refusal to deal allows derogation when a business
operator has "valid reasons." It is unclear why the drafters accord a special
treatment to unilateral refusal to deal and how this statutory difference will
affect inquiry of unilateral refusal to deal. Because unilateral refusal to deal
has to do with the "essential facility doctrine, 20 9 how AMAB will assess
the legality of a unilateral refusal to deal is of great importance.
5. Concentration
Until recently, industry concentration has posed little concern in China.
As discussed earlier, Chinese firms are generally small and in industries
separate from those monopolized by the state; thus, concentration is lacking
or low. The government has long fostered an official policy of encouraging
mergers and all forms of combinations, with the conviction that increased
scale enhances competitiveness and breaks up market fragmentation. 210 At
the same time, against the high tides of international merger in most parts of
the world, mergers and acquisitions only made up six percent of the total
FDI in China by early 2002,211 mainly due to legal uncertainty caused by a
vacuum in regulation. However, as foreign companies intensify their ef-
forts to penetrate further into China's market, mergers and acquisitions are
rapidly gaining momentum. Chapter Four of the Draft sets out basic rules
to address concentration control as a general matter. Most notably, both to
facilitate and regulate growing demand of mergers and acquisitions by for-
eign investors, the Provisional Rules on Merger with and Acquisition of
Domestic China Enterprises by Foreign Investors212 ("Provisional Rules")
was adopted on March 7, 2003. It includes important and more detailed
provisions on merger control, which constitute the first sections enacted
into law under the emerging competition legal regime. The Provisional
Rules also diverge from the Draft on some substantial points; this reflects a
208 See A.B.A. Section Of Antitrust Law, Predatory Pricing, 1996 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SEC. MONOGRAPH 22, at 57-60.
209 U.S. v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See generally HERBERT HOVENK-
AMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 305-311
(2d ed. 1999).210 See, e.g., Provisions of the State Council on Several Issues Concerning Further Pro-
moting Horizontal Economic Combinations (Mar. 23, 1986), State Council (1986) 36; State
Economic & Trade Commission: Guidelines of the Industry Structure Adjustment for the
Tenth Five-Year Plan, October 2001.
211 See Gu Lizhi, Regulations on Merger by Multinational Firms Will be Enacted Soon,
ZHONG Guo JIYING BAO, Apr. 5, 2003, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/
20020405/703060.html.
212 The Draft, supra note 6, at Ch. 4.
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widely-understood urgency to prevent expansion of foreign investment into
dominance, while encouraging the growth of domestic firms.21 3 The Draft
reserves much discretion for the enforcement authorities while the Provi-
sional Rules adopt stricter rules that are also comparatively easier to en-
force. As the concentration control provisions in the Provisional Rules can,
with minor changes, still be in force as a special regulation after the enact-
ment of the general antimonopoly law, the dichotomy will likely continue
to enforce different policies toward enterprises, depending on the national-
ity of their investors. The regulations on concentration will attract the most
immediate attention from foreign countries and multinational corporations
because large scale multi-jurisdictional merger activities might be impeded
or thwarted by the newly-minted merger standards stipulated in the Draft.
(a) Scope of Application: the Definition of Concentration
By replacing the term "merger" in an earlier draft with a much more
broadly defined "concentration," the drafters intended to target a wide spec-
trum of measures that result in enterprise integrations and combinations.
These include merger, control through purchase of shares or assets, and
agreement to form a control relationship through agency, joint venture or
any other method.1 4 The Company Law defines a merger very narrowly: a
merger occurs when one or more enterprises merges into an existing enter-
prise or more than two enterprises combine to become a new enterprise.2 15
In each case, at least one of the pre-merger enterprises totally loses eco-
nomic independence. But other measures of concentration, which are more
difficult to judge, are afforded no clue beyond "control" either in the Draft
or in any other law currently in force. For example, there is so far no legal
standard to decide what constitutes a "holding" or "controlling" relation-
ship.
Some countries set forth a clear standard to assess "control." For in-
stance, in section 37 of the German GWB, "control" is explained as "consti-
tuted by rights, contracts or any other means" that "confer the possibility of
exercising decisive influence on an undertaking" through rights to use as-
sets or composition, voting, or decisions of the organs of the undertaking.
In the case of the acquisition of shares, concentration happens if the shares
reach 50% or "25% of the capital or the voting rights of the other undertak-
ing."
213 See Editorial, Anti-monopoly: Promoting Competition by Legislation, CHINA 2 1 ST
CENTURY Bus. HERALD (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/
20030327/jd/200303260705.asp.
214 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 25.
215 See P.R.C. Company Law, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW 386, at art. 184 (Yabo Lin trans.,
1994). The Company Law was adopted on Dec 29, 1993 at the fifth meeting of the Standing
Committee of the 8th NPC and was amended on Dec 25, 1999, at the thirteenth meeting of
the Standing Committee of the 9th NPC.
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The Provisional Rules, on the other hand, apply even when the foreign
investor is not the controlling shareholder after the merger or acquisition.
As long as there is foreign investment involved in the merger or acquisition,
it must comply with the requirements of the Provisional Rules, including
prohibitions on "excessive concentration," "exclusion of or limitation on
competition, ' '21 6 and the substantive requirements contained in Articles 19
to 22.2 7 Under Article 2, foreign investors can directly purchase the stock
of a "domestic company," 215 establish a foreign investment enterprise that
buys the assets of an enterprise seated in China, or directly buy the assets of
an enterprise seated in China to establish a foreign investment enterprise.
(b) Obligation to Apply for Approval
The Draft requires business operators to apply for approval for enter-
prise concentration if certain conditions are met. This means that a concen-
tration cannot be consummated without approval from the competition
authorities. This is a stricter rule than those in jurisdictions where the obli-
gation is to notify rather than to apply for approval. A rather common prac-
tice in other countries is to impose a waiting period after which the merger
can proceed absent objections from the competition authorities. In the
United States, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires a transaction be delayed
for thirty days (or fifteen days in the case of a cash tender offer). If antitrust
agencies take no action, the transaction can be consummated when the wait-
ing period has expired.21 9 In the European Union, notification of concentra-
tion must be made within a week of conclusion of the proposed agreement,
announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling inter-
est.22° As in the Draft, concentration with a Community dimension may not
be consummated before obtaining Commission clearance.221 The Draft al-
lows ninety days for the AMAB to make a decision, but it also allows ex-
tension of the review period "under special circumstances," which may be
subject to wide interpretation.
216 Provisional Rules, supra note 6, at art. 3.
217 Id. at art. 4. (where, according to the Foreign Investment Industries Guideline, "in in-
dustries where Chinese parties must remain the controlling shareholders or comparative con-
trolling shareholders, after enterprises thereof have been merged or acquired, the Chinese
parties will remain the controlling or comparative controlling shareholder")218 Although the original Chinese phrase used here was "company seated inside China,"
the language suggests that it refers to an enterprise in China without foreign investment be-
fore the merger or acquisition. See, e.g., Provisional Rules, supra note 6, at art. 2.219 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
220 European Commission Merger Relations, art. 4, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 4 available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga- doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&n
umdoc=31989R4064&model=guichett (last visited Jan. 3, 2004).221 Commission Decision on Dec. 1, 1997, Kirch/Bertelsmann, Case IV/M.993, available
at http://europa.en.int/commi/competition/mergers/cases/index/bynr-m9.htn/#m993.
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The Provisional Rules set out somewhat different rules for cases in-
volving foreign investors. Investors are required to notify the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC") and SAIC2 22 about
the intended merger or acquisition and about certain conditions under Arti-
cle 19. The language of this provision seems not to require approval, but as
the two government agencies are in charge of approval and registration of
foreign investment enterprises, the merger or acquisition cannot be legally
consummated without their approval. In fact, from the perspective of en-
forcement alone, this arrangement is much more effective, since a separate
independent AMAB does not have the same leverage and power on the
merger or acquisition participants. The notification obligation arises under
one of the four specified circumstances.223  Furthermore, even if none of
these conditions are met, upon request of domestic competitors, relevant
administrative agencies or trade associations, MOFETC and SAIC may re-
quire notification from the foreign investors if they believe the merger or
acquisition gives rise to important considerations such as large market
share, or if it seriously affects market competition, national livelihood, and
national economic security.224 Therefore, the notification obligation in a
merger or acquisition involving foreign investors is triggered by multi-
pronged and more easily met conditions.
Even more notable is Article 21225 on mergers and acquisitions con-
ducted outside China. This provision is obviously not in tune with the ap-
222 MOFETC is in charge of approving establishment and mergers of foreign investment
enterprises; SAIC is responsible for registration or changes of registration of foreign invest-
ment enterprises. According to a new restructuring plan of the State Council approved in the
tenth meeting of the tenth NPC on March 10, 2003, a new Ministry of Commerce has been
established that will take over the functions of MOFETC, and MOFETEC will soon cease to
exist completely.
223 See the Draft, supra note 6, at art. 1 (obligation to notify arises when (1) any partici-
pant has a turnover of more than 1.5 billion RMB in the Chinese market in the same year; (2)
foreign investors have merged or acquired more than ten enterprises in domestic related in-
dustries within one year; (3) any participant has a market share of twenty percent in the Chi-
nese market; (4) the proposed M&A will enable any of the participants to obtain a market
share of twenty-five percent in Chinese market. The M&A participants are deemed to in-
clude affiliated enterprises of the foreign investors.)
224 Id.
225 According to Article 21 of the Provisional Rules, supra note 6, participants must sub-
mit their proposed merger plan to MOFTEC and SAIC for review before publicizing the plan
or at the same time they notify the authorities in their residing countries if any of the follow-
ing conditions are met: (1) any participant has total assets of more than three billion RMB in
China; (2) any participant has a turnover of more than 1.5 billion RMB in the Chinese mar-
ket in the same year; (3) any participant together with its affiliated enterprises has a market
share of twenty percent in the Chinese market; (4) the extraterritorial merger or acquisition
will enable any participant and its affiliated enterprises to obtain a market share of twenty-
five percent; and (5) because of the extraterritorial merger or acquisition, any participant will
hold shares directly or indirectly in fifteen foreign investment enterprises in related domestic
industries.
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plication scope of the Provisional Rules, but it falls in line with the extrater-
ritoriality principle in the Draft, which stipulates that the law shall apply to
behavior outside the territory of China that violates the provisions of the
law and limits or affects market competition in China.
226
With regard to the territorial scope of the merger regulations, as men-
tioned earlier, Article 2 of the Draft contains a provision to recognize the
extraterritorial application of the law. The Provisional Rules sets out spe-
cial provisions on mergers and acquisitions abroad, which are different
from the general rules in the Draft. Even under the same Provisional rules,
Article 21 on extraterritorial mergers contains a standard that differs slightly
from Article 19 on mergers inside China. Since procedural rules for ap-
proval set in Article 20 only apply "when any of the circumstances speci-
fied in Article 19 in a merger with or acquisition of domestic enterprises by
foreign investors," it does not apply to mergers abroad. This is important
because this structure in effect only spells out the threshold to trigger the
notification obligation, with no other corresponding provisions on related
substantive or procedural matters, such as required filing information, re-
view period, or consequences for failure to notify, which are necessary to
meaningfully effectuate control on foreign merger.
One could argue that the general provisions in the Draft, once adopted,
would apply to extraterritorial merger by the absence of special rules.
However, tensions would ensue in this situation for two reasons. First, the
problem of different enforcement institutions would need to be solved be-
fore this could take place. MOFTEC and SAIC are merger control institu-
tions, but not strictly competition institutions, which under the Draft are to
be established under the State Council. Without proper harmonization, the
rules enforced by the AMAB cannot apply to merger participants who are
obliged to notify MOFTEC and SAIC. Second, it would also create an
anomaly in which mergers and acquisitions involving foreign investors in
China are governed by specially-tailored rules, while those happening out-
side China that bear more special features, would be given the same treat-
ment as purely domestic mergers. Thus, control of extraterritorial mergers,
as embodied only in Article 21, is far from complete or successful.
(c) Approval
If any of the following three conditions under Article 29 is found, a
concentration will not be permitted: (1) eliminating or limiting market
competition; (2) hindering the healthy development of the national econ-
omy; and (3) damaging the public interests. To determine whether the pro-
posed transaction eliminates or limits market competition, one should
define a relevant market (i.e., a product and geographic market). But under
the other two requirements, a method used to define a relevant market
226 Provisional Rules, supra note 6, at art. 2.
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would practically determine the outcome of substantive merger review. As
seen in U.S. Merger Guidelines, the determination of a relevant market re-
quires highly-sophisticated economic analysis. It remains to be seen how
AMAB will define a relevant market.
The standards for substantive merger review in the Draft depart from
the EC or German Merger Regulations. These regulations adopt the crite-
rion called "dominant position." EC Merger Regulation prohibits any pro-
posed merger "which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result
of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the com-
mon market or in a substantial part of it."'2  In the first condition, "elimi-
nating or limiting market competition, " the Draft standard would appear to
be closer to the U.S. standard, which states that the effect of the proposed
acquisition "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly., 22 g The rationale behind this standard is unclear but since the
previous draft followed a "dominant position" standard, the drafters must
have fully understood what different standards mean for merger review.
According to U.S. Merger Guidelines, U.S. enforcement agencies are con-
cerned with merger transactions that would enhance the likelihood of collu-
sion, actual or tacit. Although the "unilateral effects doctrine," heavily
influenced by the so-called "Post-Chicago School, ' 22 9 was added in its 1992
revision, the predominant concern U.S. agencies have over merger activities
is collusive (cartel-like) anticompetitive behavior after consummation of the
merger.
As explained in the previous section, a "dominant position" test tends
to take into account not only price or output effects as in the United States,
but also other factors that could affect the structure of the market and com-
petitive process in the post-merger. As seen in the recent GE/Honeywell
case,2 30 different standards among countries concerned might create signifi-
cant tensions and lead to diminishing international business transactions.
227 European Commission Merger Regulations, supra note 220, at art. 2.
228 Clayton Act, supra note 219.229 See Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago
School View, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust:
A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 257 (2001); Symposium, Post-Chicago
Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445 (1995). See generally Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to
Post-Chicago Antitrust, POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 60 (Antonio
Cucinotta et al. eds., 2002).
230 Case COMP/M.2220, Gen. Elec./Honeywell v. Comm'n (2001), appealpending
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm./competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf
Action Brought on Sept. 12, 2001 by the General Electric Company against the Commission,
2001 O.J. (C 331) 24. For an excellent account of this case, see Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers In
Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 457 (2002). For an account defending the EC's decision, see Gftz Drauz, Unbundling
GE/Honeywell: The Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers Under EC Competition Law, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 885 (2002).
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Although the first standard in the Draft is similar to that of the United
States, the other two elements-hindering the healthy development of the
national economy and damaging the public interests-are likely to create a
great deal of uncertainty with respect to the merger review of the AMAB.
Clearly only the first element is grounded in competition theory, while the
other two are socioeconomic considerations. "Public interests," used as a
Chinese legal term, is a catch-all routinely subject to wide interpretations to
the fullest possible degree. The likelihood that China will clash on merger
policies with the countries concerned is much greater.
Some other countries such as Germany, Korea, and Japan allow a pro-
posed merger based on non-competition grounds. For instance, Article 42
of the GWB states that the government shall authorize a concentration pro-
hibited by the Federal Cartel Office ("FCO") if the restraint of competition
is outweighed by the "advantages to the economy as a whole following
from the concentration, or if the concentration is justified by an overriding
public interest." Yet in those countries non-competition elements can act
only as "an exception"-not as an element with equal weight as competi-
tion elements-in extremely rare cases.
Under the Provisional Rules, clearer standards are employed although
they will still need substantial interpretation in enforcement. For mergers
and acquisitions involving foreign investors both inside and outside of
China, authorities must base their decision on a determination of whether
the proposed merger or acquisition will "result in excessive concentration,"
"hamper fair competition," or "harm the interests of consumers,, 231 none of
which are explained. When antimonopoly concerns arise, MOFTEC and
SAIC may separately or jointly hold public hearings and make a decision
within 90 days upon receipt of all required information (not specified by the
Provisional Rules). No extension of the review period is allowed.
The Draft authorizes AMAB to grant "special approval" when a con-
centration found to eliminate or limit competition within a specified area is232
advantageous to the national economy and the public interests. Unlike
the draft, the GWB does not explicitly recognize the advantages of in-
creased competition resulting from the concentration. One might argue it
falls into the broader categories of "national economy" or "public interests."
However, under the criteria to appraise concentration in Article 29, "na-
tional economy" and "public interests" are parallel and separate considera-
tions to "market competition"; it is thus hard to incorporate market
competition into either of the criteria. The fact that the "competition" factor
is not included in the exemption provision seems to deliberately exclude it
from consideration.
231 Provisional Rules, supra note 6, at arts. 20 and 21.
232 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 30.
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By contrast, the Provisional Rules provide a clearer and close-ended
exemption checklist under Article 22.233 Any participants in mergers and
acquisitions may apply to MOFTEC and SAIC for "review exemption" if
the intended merger or acquisition falls into any of the categories. Interest-
ingly, not only are "improvements of competition condition" listed, but the
other factors the authorities may consider in granting an exemption are de-
fined much more narrowly.
(d) Sanctions
According to Article 46 of the Draft, when a business operator violates
Article 26 by carrying out a concentration without prior approval, the
AMAB can order the parties to terminate the concentration, revert to the
original business operations within a deadline, or pay a fine between RMB
one hundred thousand and ten million. Since Article 26 imposes the obliga-
tion to notify, this sanction can be understood to apply to that obligation or
consummation of a concentration despite a prohibition by the AMAB.
Compared with other provisions on sanctions where the termination of a
violation and a fine may be imposed, use of the term "or" here suggests that
a fine can be used as an alternative to dissolution. A fine may be preferred
because it is understandably easier to implement than dissolution either by
AMAB or the court upon application by the AMAB; a failure to enforce
dissolution would undermine the deterrence effect of the sanction, espe-
cially to the larger concentrations.
No remedy or sanction is set out by the Provisional Rules for the
merger control provision in Articles 19-22. Realistically, this is not a prob-
lem for most mergers inside China covered by this regulation. The required
application and review for merger control reasons is part of the approval
and registration process 234 for foreign investment enterprises. Without ap-
proval from MOFEC and SAIC, no merger or acquisition can be legally
consummated and protected. There is still a loophole, however, which may
arise if a merger is never subject to review due to the failure to notify the
authorities upon consummation by the participants. This is possible be-
cause some of the standards used to trigger the obligation to notify are sus-
ceptible to different applications. For example, the participants and the
authorities may disagree on whether the market share standard has been
met. When a merger or acquisition has been consummated which the au-
thorities believe should have been subject to prior scrutiny, uncertainty
arises as to whether and how to impose sanctions. In addition, for mergers
233 Parties can apply for exemption if the concentration (1) may lead to improvements of
conditions of market competition, (2) restructures enterprises with loss and ensures employ-
ment, (3) introduces advanced technology and management and enhances international com-
petitiveness of the enterprises, (4) may improve the environment. See Provisional Rules,
supra note 6, at art. 27.
234 Id. at art. 5.
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and acquisitions realized abroad under Article 21, MOFTEC and SAIC
have no regulatory power to enforce merger control. The only factor that
may induce voluntary compliance is that at least one of the participants un-
der Article 21 has substantial business inside China. Their overall stake in
the Chinese market may help to encourage compliance with Chinese law
and avoid confrontation with government agencies.
6. Enforcement Mechanism
One of the most difficult issues in drafting the antimonopoly law is to
establish a competent institutional enforcement system which has contrib-
uted to the lawmakers' lingering hesitation to complete the work.235 Rele-
vant provisions in the Draft on institutional arrangements leave many
questions unanswered, especially in light of the Chinese legal system as a
whole. From a comparative law perspective, the Draft itself provides for
relatively strong enforcement tools: unlike Korea and Japan, but similar to
the United States and Germany, it allows private citizens to file a civil suit
without waiting for the administrative procedures to be finished by the en-
forcement agency. Unlike the European Union and Germany, but similar to
the United States, Korea, and Japan, it provides for criminal prosecution.
Notably, the Draft stipulates "social supervision" of anticompetitive behav-
iors stating that "[the] State encourages, supports and protects social super-
vision of monopoly by all organizations and individuals. 236 According to
Article 36 under Chapter Six on the 'anti-monopoly administration body',
the AMAB of the State Council shall investigate and impose administrative
sanctions on illegal monopolistic conduct. Article 53 of the Draft provides
affected parties the opportunity for recourse in a court. An interested party
can file an application for review of any penalty decision to AMAB, and
further appeal to a court. In the alternative, the party may choose to appeal
to the court directly. At the same time, Articles 49 and 50 provide for pri-
vate litigation and rights for compensation.237 In cases involving adminis-
trative monopoly, the injured parties will be able to invoke administrative
suits against the government or its officials. In addition, Articles 45 and 47
leave open the possibility of criminal prosecution for abuse of dominant
market position and officials engaging in administrative monopoly. The
Draft endeavors to establish the administrative enforcement mechanism by
creating an administrative enforcement institution, while other proceedings
must rely on pre-existing proceedings not specific to antimonopoly cases.
235 See, e.g., Tang Wenhong, Discussion on Setting Up Competent Anti-Monopoly Au-
thority in China (working paper), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/about/apec/
capacitybuilding/Chinal .pdf (last visited May 20, 2003).
236 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 7.
237 These articles are under Chapter 7 on "Legal Liabilities." See id.
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(a) Administrative Enforcement Agency
The Anti-Monopoly Administration Body of the State Council is ex-
pected to play a major role in administering the antimonopoly law. The
Draft confers on the AMAB a variety of responsibilities under Article 37,
including the ability to issue antimonopoly policies and rules, investigate
matters relating to antimonopoly provisions under the antimonopoly law,
resolve all matters requiring its approval provisions under this law, investi-
gate market competition conditions, investigate and dispose cases that vio-
late the antimonopoly law, and maintain reports of offenses. But the Draft
fails to specify which institution will serve as the AMAB, leaving the issue
for later legislation. Two options have been under consideration during the
drafting process: the establishment of a new agency and the authorization
of SAIC as the enforcement institution.238 Each option entails difficulties
and considerations.
To establish a new government agency would be preferable if the dis-
advantages of SAIC can be overcome by optimally designing the institution
to improve the efficacy of enforcement. In other jurisdictions, competition
enforcement authorities are afforded different legal safeguards to ensure
their independence and authority.239 Similar measures would be hard, if not
totally impossible, to imitate in China. Under the current organizational
structure of the State Council, only the Auditing Bureau is directly under
the Premier, a unique status guaranteed explicitly by the Constitution.24 0 A
centralized administrative responsibility system requires that the Premier
assume all responsibility for the work of the State Council and that minis-
ters assume all responsibility of the work of their respective ministries and
commissions.2 4' In each ministry or commission, only the nomination of
the head official by the Premier is subject to approval by the National Peo-
ple's Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee.24 2 Even those approvals
are essentially procedural and are always granted due to the absence of op-
posing forces in the NPC. The government officials are selected by a uni-
238 People's Republic of China, supra note 7.
239 In the United States, the FTC consists of five commissioners, nominated by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate, each serving a seven-year term. No more than three
commissioners can be of the same political party. See http://www.ftc.gov/bios/
commissioners.htm. In Japan, the Fair Trade Commission is charged with similar powers as
that of the AMAB and is administratively attached to the Prime Minister. (Chapter VIII § 27-
2). Its members, one chairman and four commissioners, are appointed by the Prime Minister
with consent of both Houses (§ 29(2)). The Korean FTC serves under the Prime Minister.
In Germany, the FCO, according to law, is an independent higher federal authority. See
GWB 51 (1). The members of the ten-decision divisions of the FCO are servants appointed
for life with qualifications to serve as judges or senor civil servants. Id. at GWB 51(4).
240 Xianfa, at art. 91 [Constitution of the People's Republic of China(1982)], available at
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/lawtran l.htmart.
241 Id. at art. 86, 90.
242 Id. at arts. 62 § 5; 67 § 9.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 24:107 (2003)
form examination requiring no special knowledge or experience.243 Their
appointment, promotion, salary and term of office are subject to internal
discretion, ultimately with the approval of CCP's personnel department.
Under such a system, even if by future legislation the AMAB is granted
special status directly under the Premier, the lack of independence and
qualification of its workers will undermine its strength and capability.
The main argument for authorizing the SAIC as the AMAB is that it
has accumulated certain experience in dealing with antimonopoly cases un-
der LCUC.2 44 However, as explained earlier, the lack of independence of
the SAIC and its branches have caused serious problems even in enforcing
the limited antimonopoly provisions under the LCUC. In April 2001, the
government had to establish a separate ad hoc working group directly under
the State Council in order to administer the intensified national campaign
against administrative monopoly. 45 To charge all the antimonopoly work
to SAIC would seem highly unadvisable. In addition, under its current or-
ganizational structure, it is also not feasible to transform the SAIC into an
independent antimonopoly agency. SAIC is charged with a wide range of
functions including enterprise registration, trademark administration, con-
sumer rights protection, and advertisement regulation.2 46 Only one of its
twenty-eight divisions, the Fair Trade Bureau, oversees market order and
administers competition policy. 247 Furthermore, SAIC also heads the AICs
at the various local levels, which makes it a bureaucracy too large to re-
form.
Another thorny problem is determining the number of necessary levels
of the AMAB, which remains an open question, as the Draft only states that
the AMAB may "according to the needs of fulfilling its responsibilities, es-
tablish dispatch offices.,,2 48 It is a common practice to establish multilevel
enforcement institutions. 249 However, China's concern is that one level of
local office under the AMAB would not be enough.250 The rampant local
protectionism and fragmented market set China in a very different situation
than most other countries with an open and unified national market. The
large number of violations, the majority of which are small and local, re-
243 See Provisional Rules, supra note 6.
244 Wenhong, supra note 235.
245 State Council, supra note 37.
246 For the functions and organizational structure of SAIC, see http://www.saic.gov.cn.
247 id.
248 The Draft, supra note 6, at art. 43.
249 In the United States, the FTC maintains a regional presence with offices in seven geo-
graphical areas across the country. See http://www.ftc.gov/ro/romap2.htm. In Germany, the
Federal Ministry of Economics, and FCO, together with sixteen state cartel offices, enforces
antitrust law through administrative proceedings (ABA G-8). The General Secretariat of Ja-
pan's Fair Trade Commission includes seven local offices. Sec. 35-2, available at
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/about/role/q-2.htm.
250 Wenhong, supra note 235.
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quires routine antimonopoly enforcement at a grassroots level. In the anti-
monopoly campaign of 2001, more than 127,000 cases of monopoly were
recorded across the country from April to November alone. 25' This would
seem to require multilevel branches under the AMAB; on the other hand,
too many levels of branches under the AMAB would inevitably lead to the
dependence of local governments just as is the case with the AICs, and the
anti-monopoly mission would fall prey to administrative interference.
252
(b) Judicial Review of AMAB's Decision
An interested party can appeal to the court directly for review of any
penalty decision rendered by the AMAB. As the penalty decision involves
imposing administrative sanctions, by using this provision the interested
party invokes the general judicial review system of administrative actions in
China.
Judicial review was built into the Chinese legal system in 1989 when
administrative su song (litigation) was allowed in the Administrative Litiga-
tion Law ("ALL").253 According to Article 2 of the ALL, any individual or
entity whose interests or rights have been deemed infringed by a specific
action of an administrative organ (zu zhi) or the personnel thereof, can bring
a suit before a court according to the law. Article 5 set up administrative
divisions inside the courts at all levels in order to exercise jurisdiction on
administrative suits.
The Chinese judicial review system is ill-suited to protect individual
rights from abuse of administrative power. Despite improvements in recent
years, the judiciary lacks independence and has been under increasing criti-
cism for corruption. The courts are especially powerless in administrative
litigation because the current structure of China's court system and the sys-
tem for the selection and promotion of judges subject the courts to the in-
fluence of local governments regarding personnel as well as financial and
material resources, making interference with the courts by local govern-
ments inevitable. The special nature of the defendant in administrative liti-
gation has predetermined that interference and obstacles in handling
administrative cases will be even greater than for other types of adjudica-
tion. Often, the trial of administrative cases is subject to illegal interfer-
ences by local governments, local people's congresses, and local
251 See Geng Zhensong, Antimonopoly Law and Regulations to Combat Local Protection-
ism Expected, BEIJING QING NIAN BAO (Dec 12, 2001), available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/3586/20011212/625037.html.
252 Wenhong, supra note 235.
253 Adopted at the Second Session of the Seventh National People's Congress Standing
Committee on April 4, 1989, promulgated by Order No. 16 of the President of the People's
Republic of China on April 4, 1989, and effective as of October 1, 1990. Some people also
translate it as Administrative Procedural Law.
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Communist Party committees, compromising fairness in trying and decid-
ing administrative cases according to law.
The difficulty of enforcing court judgments and orders has been a
daunting problem, and is particularly serious in administrative cases. As
the courts lack authority and independence, administrative agencies as de-
fendants often defy their judgments and orders. Methods of enforcement
stipulated by the ALL, such as "fining" and "providing judicial recommen-
dations to administrative agencies, ' '254 are far from being effective to solve
the enforcement problems.
Compounding the reality of the unequal powers of the litigants in the
administrative cases are the inadequate provisions and outdated underlying
philosophy of the ALL. With respect to important issues such as the scope
of review, jurisdiction, standing of parties and sanctions, the ALL provides
minimal checks on administrative agencies exercising their power.256 The
public discontent and the defects of the current ALL and judicial review
system have finally led to a legislative overhaul. A working group organ-
ized by the National People's Congress is finalizing a draft to comprehen-
sively rewrite the ALL. However, the final product remains to be seen, and
some of the problems, such as the lack of independence of the judiciary,
will not be solved simply by creating a new ALL.
(c) Private Civil Suit
Article 49 of the Draft provides, "if the legal rights and interests of
business operators or consumers are damaged by any monopolistic behav-
ior, they can file a petition with the People's Court." Article 50 affords in-
jured parties the right to sue a business operator who violates the
antimonopoly law for damages. The injured party is compensated with ac-
tual losses and forecasted profits, or if such losses are difficult to calculate,
the profit gained by the violator plus reasonable expenses incurred in inves-
tigation and litigation.
The civil suit based on Articles 49 and 50 presents two salient features
on its face. First, it allows private parties to bring a suit in court to recover
loss directly upon discovering anticompetitive actions that are harmful to
them. Unlike the laws in Korea and Japan, the Draft does not require a de-
cision from the competition law enforcement institution as a prerequisite.
Private suits can be initiated totally independent of administrative proceed-
254 WORKING GROUP ON REVISING THE ALL, REPORT (2003) (on file with the author).
255 Interview with Professor Ma Huaide, Professor, China University of Political Science
and Law, in New Haven, Conn. (Jan. 20, 2003). In one case, the court found the administra-
tive sanction imposed by the defendant government agency illegal and ordered it to make a
new decision in accordance with the law. However, the defendant made the same decision
again and again, forcing the plaintiffs to go to the court four times.
256 id.
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ings. It also appears less restrictive than the German system, which re-
quires specific legislative intent: the violated provision must "serve to pro-
tect another" and the violator must have "acted willfully or negligently.
' 257
In granting a cause of action, Chinese legislation hardly ever requires intent,
although intent may be considered by the judges in deciding cases. Having
no requirement of willfulness or negligence, as in tort actions, undoubtedly
makes it easier for the private parties to recover loss. The provisions seem
to readily permit damage actions, and thus appear more similar to the U.S.
system.
Second, Articles 49 and 50 do not permit private suits for injunctive re-
lief; it only allows damages. In contrast, Section 16 of the U.S. Clayton Act
authorizes private parties to sue for injunctions. In other civil law jurisdic-
tions such as Germany,258 Japan2 59 and Taiwan, 260 injunctive relief is also
available in private actions. Injunctive relief is an alien notion in China's
legal system, which follows the civil law tradition. However, the Draft au-
thorizes the AMAB to issue "cease and desist" orders.26' Such orders,
when unheeded, are subject to enforcement by the court on the AMAB's
application.26 2
In the United States, some scholars are of the view that the private
right of action increases the efficiency of antitrust enforcement, as it enlists
the participation of parties closest to the information and affords a safe-
guard against lax public enforcement without expanding public enforcement
bureaus.263 Others, however, are more skeptical.2 6 In China, the formida-
ble mission to combat anticompetitive activities, the shrinking state power,
and ineffective institutions all make the supplement of public enforcement
with suits by members of a mobilized public desirable. In fact, public dis-
content has provided the primary momentum in recent antimonopoly cam-
paigns; public participation has been encouraged and has proved
instrumental. However, as the experience of some other countries demon-
strates, the efficacy of the private action is subject to various contingencies
and for a country with a developing legal system as China, many hurdles
257 Haley, supra note 140.
258 Gesetzgegen Wettbewersbeschrankungen [GWB] §33 (F.R.G.) available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/.
259 http://www.jftc.go.jp/dokusen/4/index.htm (June 10, 2003)
260 Fair Trade Act, at art. 30 (Taiwan).
261 The Draft, supra note 6, at arts. 44-46.
212 Id. at art. 52.
263 Ernest Gellhorn & William E. Kovaicic, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICs 462-463
(2d ed. 1994).
264 See Posner, supra note 84, at 275 (observing that "students of the antitrust laws have
been appalled by the wild and woolly antitrust suits that the private bar has brought-and
won. It is felt that many of these would not have been brought by a public agency and that,
in short, the influence of the private action on the development of antitrust doctrine has been
on the whole a pernicious one.").
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are to be expected. Certain difficulties are predictable in the use of private
civil actions in China.
The first difficulty faced by plaintiffs in a civil action is the compe-
tency of the court. Before the Judge's Law in 1995, no uniform credentials
were required of judges, and formal legal training was not a prerequisite.265
It was not until 2001 that all junior judges were required to pass a national
266judicial exam to meet minimum qualifications. In addition, most courts
are overloaded with cases. In 1999, the total number of cases across the na-
tion amounted to 6.23 million. By the end of July 2002, 1.85 million cases
had been accumulated, to be handled by the 170 thousand judges nation-
ally.267 The Chinese Civil Procedural Law imposes time limits on trials,
which must be completed within six months, although the limit may be ex-
tended upon approval. 268 The capability of the ill-prepared, overworked
judges who are under constant pressure to beat time limits in dealing with
normally-complicated antimonopoly cases is highly doubtful.
Although Article 50 seems to encourage damage actions, the civil suits
have to follow the general civil procedural rules and are subject to their
constraints. An important uncertainty remains regarding the ability of pri-
vate antitrust plaintiffs to have standing to obtain relief. Article 50 requires
the plaintiff to be one whose "rights and interests" have been violated. Ar-
ticle 108(1) of the Civil Procedural Law sets a substantive test that the
plaintiff must show a "direct interest" in the case. Both provisions are simi-
larly vague and general, offering little guidance in setting up standards. In
the United States, the federal courts have developed rules to narrow the set
of plaintiffs who have standing to attack antitrust violations. Such restric-
tions include proof of injury to "business or property," allegations of "anti-
trust injury," and proximity to the source of harm.2 9 Such limitations and
standards are necessary and needed, especially in China, as it has no prece-
dent, Chinese judges have limited power to interpret law and the ambiguity
of the provisions' language will lead to confusion and inconsistency.
Compared with the U.S. antitrust system, private actions in civil law
countries such as Germany and Japan have been portrayed as ineffective
265 Zhonghua Remnin Gong He Guo Guo Wu Yuan Guong Bao, People's Republic of
China State Council Published Report [Guowuynan Gongbao] art. 9(6) (P.R.C.) (stating that
anyone with a college degree other than in law, but with "legal knowledge," after working in
the court for two years, can be qualified to be a judge).266 Id. at art. 12.
267 See He Bing, Workload Crisis Under the Current Court System and Its Solution,
LEGAL FORUM, available at http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/pljdft.asp?id= {F5A9EAA0-6B27-
40F8-8D3A-7104CB63399F} (last visited May 31, 2003).
268 Article 135 of the Civil Procedure Law, Apr. 9, 1991, President's Order 44. The time
limit is renewable for another six months with permission from the head of the court. If still
more time is needed, the judge can apply to the higher court for extension.269 Gellhom & Kovaicic, supra note 263, at 463.
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and rarely used.2 70 The paucity of civil actions has been attributed to sev-
eral causes, most importantly to the lack of class actions, a discovery sys-
tem, and treble damages.2 7' In China, unlike in Japan and Korea, the class
action is generally allowed in a civil action.272 Thus far, there is no prohibi-
tion to exclude its use in any particular case. However, the lack of a dis-
covery system will pose a problem to the Chinese private parties in proving
that they deserve damages.
The problem is exacerbated by the current evidentiary rules applied in
civil suits. In an effort to transform the litigation structure from an inquisi-
tional to an adversarial system, the 1991 Civil Procedural Law adopted a
new principle that the party that raises the claim has the burden of produc-
273ing the evidence. While judges in the past had to conduct the investiga-
tion and gather most of the evidence, today the plaintiff will lose the case if
he fails to provide sufficient evidence, with the exception of certain explicit
stipulations, which shift the burden of proof to the defendant. 7 4 Although
the law requires judges to gather evidence that the plaintiffs are not able to
obtain, 27 5 judges' heavy workload makes this option impracticable. Be-
cause plaintiffs in an antimonopoly civil case do not enjoy the benefit of a
discovery system, and because they have a short time to present evidence,
they are bound to find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove their
damages successfully.
Treble damages, as are found in U.S. antitrust law, serve as an impor-
tant incentive to bring private suits. In China, although the losing defendant
may have to pay processing fees and reasonable fees incurred in investiga-
tion by the plaintiffs, the substantial lawyer's fees in many cases are not
necessarily included. Therefore, there is little incentive for the prospective
plaintiff to pursue a case, especially with so many other difficulties in-
volved in civil litigation.
There is, however, no theoretical barrier to treble damages themselves.
According to the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Con-
sumers ("Consumers' Law"), 76 consumers are entitled to double damages
against fraudulent practices of business operators.277 This provision has
270 Haley, supra note 140.
271 Id.
272 See Civil Procedural Law art. 55 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.isinolaw.com, and
Rules 58-64 of the Supreme Peoples' Court's Interpretation On the Application of Civil Pro-
cedural Law.
273 Civil Procedural Law art. 64. (P.R.C.), available at http://www.isinolaw.com.
274 The Supreme People's Court of China, supra note 272, at art. 74.
275 See Civil Procedural Law art. 64 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.isinolaw.com; see
also Rule 73 of the Supreme Peoples' Court's Interpretation.
276 Adopted and promulgated on Oct. 31, 1993 by the Fourth Session of the Standing
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress (NPC).
277 Article 49 of the Consumers' Law states that "[a] business operator that practices
fraud in providing a commodity or a service must, at the request of the consumer, increase
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proven to be a powerful incentive, exemplified by a series of highly-
publicized suits brought by Wang Hal, who knowingly bought fake prod-
ucts in order to bring civil suits in court. The attitudes towards Wang are
divided. The public generally considers him a fighter for consumer rights,
while the courts and some scholars are concerned that he abuses the legal
system and thus is not part of the protected category of "consumers." 78
However, double damages would not pose a problem in an antimonopoly
case, even if concerns over their use under the Consumers' Law are valid.
If the drafters are concerned that too much monetary incentive may induce
frivolous suits, double damages or the discretionary treble damages avail-
able under Taiwanese competition law279 may be considered. The lack of
such a provision is therefore an obvious pitfall in the Draft.
(d) Administrative Suit Against The Government
Article 49 of the Draft not only allows civil actions among private par-
ties (as in the United States and Germany), but it also empowers injured
parties to invoke administrative litigation when their rights are infringed by
government agencies or officials because of administrative monopoly. If
the target defendant is a government agency or official, as in administrative
monopoly cases, the injured private party will have to go through adminis-
trative litigation to subject the anticompetitive administrative action to judi-
cial review for remedy.
As explained earlier, the administrative litigation system in China af-
fords plaintiffs very little help. The injured party who invokes Article 49 is
bound to find himself particularly helpless in an administrative suit. Re-
gardless of the weaknesses of administrative trial and enforcement, a
threshold issue arises as to the scope of judicial review, which in most cases
excludes private parties from challenging administrative monopolistic be-
haviors in court.
According to the ALL, certain administrative actions are precluded
from administrative litigation, including actions against administrative rules
and regulations or decisions and orders with general binding force that are
formulated and announced by administrative organs.2 80 According to Chi-
nese legal theory, these are called "abstract administrative actions" as op-
posed to "specific" administrative actions that are actionable. 281 According
the compensation for losses incurred by such consumer. The amount of the increase in com-
pensation shall be the price of the commodity purchased or the fee for the service received
by the consumer."
278 See "Hero Lost in Court", YAN ZHAO Du SHI BAO (Sept. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channe14/977/20000904/215371.html.
279 Taiwan Fair Trade Law, art. 32 (Taiwan), available at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/
roclaw23.htm.
280 Administrative Litigation Law, art. 12 (P.R.C.) available at http://www.isinolaw.com.
281 See generally id. at art. 2.
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to a 1997 Supreme Court Judicial Interpretation,282 the "decisions and or-
ders with general binding force" exemption from judicial review pertain to
repetitively-applicable normative documents towards non-specific par-
ties. 283 Typically, administrative monopolistic behaviors are continuous ac-
tions that take the form of normative documents (administrative regulations,
rules, circulars, decisions, notices, etc.), because they are not targeted
against specific parties. Instead, they perpetuate certain anticompetitive ac-
tivities (for example, protecting local products from competition from other
areas). While such violations damage the interests of many business opera-
tors and individuals, they are not subject to judicial review under the ALL.
Some plaintiffs may be able to base their suit on suitable "specific ac-
tion," such as the imposition of a fine by the government agency for non-
compliance with an anticompetitive administrative regulation. The question
of whether the court should grant standing to the parties in such a case has
been subject to much debate and is far from settled.284 In practice, some
courts have taken these cases. But even in holding the specific action (such
as a fine) illegal, judges avoid commenting on the legality of the regulation
on which it is based. They either remain silent on the issue or base their
judgment on laws or statutes of higher authority and pass over the regula-
tion.285 In both cases, the "abstract action" (i.e., the anticompetitive norma-
tive document) remains unchallenged. Even in the rare case where an
individual party wins an administrative suit, it does not serve as a deterrent
to administrative monopoly.
(e) Criminal Prosecution
The Draft shows the government's preference to leave the issue of
criminal sanctions open. Criminal prosecutions are mentioned only in two
articles of the Draft. Noticeably, cartel activities under Chapter 2 are not
subject to criminal prosecution. The European Union and German competi-
tion laws do not provide for criminal prosecution for all anticompetitive be-
haviors. Yet in countries such as the United States, Korea, and Japan,
cartelization is the primary target of criminal antitrust enforcement.
Each criminal provision in the Draft states that if a criminal offense is
committed, the offender is to be "prosecuted and penalized accordingly." It
is possible that the drafters are still undecided over which criminal sanc-
tions to adopt, given their continuing focus on the establishment of adminis-
trative proceedings. But a more important reason is that the division of
authorities requires that only the Criminal Code impose criminal sanctions.
282 Supreme People's Court, Interpretations on Certain Issues Related to the Administra-
tive Litigation Law, Nov 24, 1999.
283 Id. at art. 3.
284 Iterview with Gan Wen, Judge of the Supreme People's Court, Administrative Sec-
tion, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 12, 2002).
285 id.
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The new 1997 Criminal Code adopted the principle that only one who
commits an offense explicitly defined by law as a criminal act can be prose-
cuted and convicted.2 6 To preserve the uniformity of criminal law, the
government has made amendments to the Criminal Code to clearly define
criminal acts.287 The NPC and its Standing Committee also issued special
decisions or decrees to clarify or interpret certain provisions of the Criminal
Code. 288 The government has not allowed any other statute to impose
criminal sanctions, so it is impossible to include a criminal provision in the
antimonopoly law, as was done in Taiwan 289
Article 47 allows for the prosecution of responsible government offi-
cials involved in an administrative monopoly. This provision does not ad-
dress antimonopoly criminal sanctions directly. Rather, it targets those
criminal offenses connected with an abuse of power in public office that
have motivated the officials' engagement in or support of anticompetitive
activities. The existing crimes include, for example, acceptance of a
bribe290 and malpractice in office.
291
Article 45 states that abuse of dominant market position may be subject
to criminal prosecution. As such specific language is not included in sanc-
tions on restrictive agreement or unauthorized concentrations, the Draft ap-
pears to exclude those other anticompetitive activities from criminal
sanctions. In contrast with Article 47, no existing crime covers abuse of
dominant market position. In order to apply this provision, a new crime and
corresponding penalties will have to be added to the current criminal law;
otherwise, this provision will remain toothless.
The Draft envisions criminal prosecution as independent from adminis-
trative proceedings. In the current criminal system, the Prosecutor's Office
is charged with exclusive authority to prosecute crime in China. Unlike the
law in Japan and Korea, the prosecutor's decision to prosecute will not be
contingent on decisions of the administrative authorities. Depending on the
circumstances in each case, investigation is conducted by the procuracy or
the police. Like the courts, however, the procuracy and the police lack
expertise and experience in antimonopoly cases. Considering the open-
ended provisions, narrow application of criminal sanctions, and low en-
forcement capability, it is likely that criminal sanctions will take a long time
to develop and remain rarely used after the adoption of the antimonopoly
law.
286 Criminal Code art. 3 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.isinolaw.com.
287 Amendments were passed on Dec. 25, 1999, Aug. 31, 2001, Dec. 29, 2001, and Dec.
28, 2002.288 For example, NPC Standing Committee's Decision Concerning Punishment of Crimi-
nal Offenses Involving Fraudulent Purchase (Dec. 20, 1998).
289 See Taiwan Fair Trade Law arts. 35 and 37 (Taiwan), available at http://www.qis.net/
chinalaw/roclaw23.htm.
290 Criminal Code, supra note 286 at art. 385.
291 Id. at ch. 9.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Draft reflects the strong desire of the Chinese government to im-
plement an economic constitution denoting the ideal competitive market.
To meet the extraordinary challenges that China is confronting, the Chinese
government introduces idiosyncratic provisions within the Draft, including
provisions on administrative monopoly. Its use of the AMAB to oppose
other governmental entities and prosecute governmental officials is also an
innovation. Similarly, the inclusion of socioeconomic standards in merger
review symbolizes an ambitious resolve to balance the market system with
collective values. The determination of the Chinese government to realize
an effective competitive market is also well-reflected in its multiple en-
forcement instruments. With the possible exception of the United States,
China, through the legal text of the Draft, provides for the most diverse
range of antimonopoly enforcement tools of any competitive regime. Fur-
thermore, exemptions to the basic obligations under the Draft are rarely al-
lowed relative to the competition laws of other jurisdictions.
However, the body of China's competition law suffers as part of the
whole Chinese legal dispensation. Without an adequate legal infrastructure,
as has been illustrated, the ambitious initiatives for an effective competitive
market might fall into disrepute. Most notably, since enforcement actions
against an administrative monopoly will often conflict with industrial poli-
cies enforced by other government agencies, the aspirations for vigorous
enforcement of competition law will be greatly circumscribed. As a result,
for a country like China, whose primary objective is economic develop-
ment, a consistent and coherent competition policy is difficult to achieve.
In this respect, private enforcement should deserve particular attention.
Unlike countries such as Korea and Japan, China allows for individuals to
get direct access to a court when a cause of action arises. Nonetheless, suc-
cessful private enforcement of competition law might be greatly hampered
by the lack of a sophisticated legal mechanism for gathering evidence and
the lack of pecuniary incentives such as treble damages. A matter of further
importance, as explained in cartel regulations and merger review, the Draft
accords the AMAB too much discretion in eradicating anticompetitive be-
haviors.
Notwithstanding the foregoing shortcomings in China's competition
law, the Chinese government should be commended for its attempts to syn-
thesize a long-standing dichotomy between deregulation and competition
policy against private anticompetitive behaviors. It is a matter of policy in
each jurisdiction to curb administrative behaviors that in many cases legal-
ize large-scale and gross violation of the spirits of competition law. There
is no question that the Chinese model integrates the programs that address
public and private anticompetitive behaviors, and presents the most direct
way of realizing a competitive market. This synthesis is predominantly
driven by China's extraordinary circumstances, but it may incidentally pro-
vide "a third way" of framing competition law that provides a tremendous
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 24:107 (2003)
example particularly for developing countries in which legal and adminis-
trative monopolies are rampant. China is still charged with the task of
building up a systemic integration that allows the competition law to effec-
tively implement deregulation.
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